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ARTICLE 
 
Advantaging Aggressors: 
Justice & Deterrence in International Law 
 
_____________________ 
Paul H. Robinson* & Adil Ahmad Haque** 
 
Abstract 
 
Current international law imposes limitations on the use of force to defend against 
unlawful aggression that improperly advantage unlawful aggressors and 
disadvantage their victims. The Article gives examples of such rules, governing a 
variety of situations, showing how clearly unjust they can be. No domestic 
criminal law system would tolerate their use. 
 
There are good practical reasons why international law should care that its rules 
are perceived as unjust. Given the lack of an effective international law 
enforcement mechanism, compliance depends to a large degree upon the moral 
authority with which international law speaks. Compliance is less likely when its 
rules are perceived as obviously unjust. This common sense perspective is 
supported by social science research showing the importance of law's moral 
credibility in gaining assistance and compliance, in reducing resistance and 
subversion, and in helping to shape shared norms. The current practice of victim 
states ignoring legal limitations, with studied indifference to such "violations" by 
the international community, only legitimizes and habituates law-breaking, 
further undermining international law's moral credibility. 
 
One important opportunity for reforming international law is currently being 
squandered. The Assembly of State Parties to the International Criminal Court 
has recently approved a resolution defining the international crime of aggression. 
However, rather than confront international law's existing problems, the drafters 
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compounded them by imposing individual criminal liability on leaders of victim 
states who authorize defensive force in violation of flawed current law.  
Fortunately, the resolution will not go into effect until 2017 at the earliest. There 
is still time to change course.   
 
Introduction 
 
 The use of force by and against states remains a persistent feature of 
international affairs. NATO forces based in Afghanistan target Taliban fighters 
based in Pakistan, while Turkish jets strike Kurdish separatists in Iraq, Columbian 
soldiers attack armed groups in Ecuador, Israeli commandos enter Gaza in their 
ongoing conflict with Hamas, and various naval powers retaliate against pirates 
docked in Somalia.  
 
As U.S. President Barack Obama observed in his speech accepting the 
Nobel Peace Prize, "[t]here will be times when nations—acting individually or in 
concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified."1 To its 
credit, international law permits states to use force when force is most clearly 
necessary and morally justified, namely in defense against an armed attack by 
another state. However, this article argues that international law restricts the use 
of defensive force by states in ways that are both unjust to victim states and 
damaging to the international system.  
  
 Part I briefly compares the functions of international law and criminal law 
rules governing the use of force. Although the former rules are directed toward 
states and the latter rules are directed toward individuals, this difference may be 
overshadowed by the fact that at root both regimes seek justice and stability. Part 
II offers a criminal law-based critique of several international law use of force rules 
that seem to produce strikingly unjust results, typically by imposing unjustified 
limitations on the use of defensive force. For example, according to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), states may not use defensive force against 
unlawful armed aggression that is limited in its scale and effects, or (it seems) 
against non-state actors using another state as a base of operations for unlawful 
aggression. One might be inclined to defer to existing international law rules 
governing the use of force on the assumption that they are the product of rich 
experience born of a long history. From the perspective of a criminal law scholar, 
however, these international law rules seem difficult to defend.   
                                                
1 Obama: ‘Peace Requires Responsibility,’ CNN (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/10/obama.transcript/index.html. 
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 Part III argues that, for good practical reasons, international law ought to 
care whether its rules are perceived as unjust by the international community. 
Given the lack of an effective international law enforcement mechanism, 
compliance depends to a large degree upon the moral authority with which 
international law speaks. Compliance is less likely when its rules are perceived as 
obviously unjust. This common sense perspective is supported by social science 
research showing the importance of law’s moral credibility in gaining assistance 
and compliance, in reducing resistance and subversion, and in helping to shape 
shared norms. The current practice of victim states ignoring legal limitations, with 
studied indifference to such “violations” by the international community, only 
legitimizes and habituates law-breaking, further undermining international law’s 
normative influence. Importantly, Part III refutes two potential objections to our 
approach: that moral intuitions regarding interpersonal violence do not apply to 
international violence; and that international law ought to sacrifice justice for the 
sake of peace.   
 
 Part IV examines interpretations of international law that would narrow 
the gap between legal rules and moral intuitions regarding defensive force. 
Reliance on these revisionist interpretations of international law may be a useful 
temporary measure, but it does not offer a comprehensive solution because the 
gap can be narrowed but not closed by reinterpretation alone. Given the flaws in 
international law’s foundational texts, in particular in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, international law must be substantially reformed in order to achieve 
consistency with shared intuitions of justice. We offer a specific proposal that 
permits the use of necessary and proportionate defensive force to prevent any use 
of armed force by states or non-state actors. 
 
 The first parts of the Article build on the analogies between international 
law and criminal law. Part V, by contrast, explains why the two bodies of law 
should operate differently in some contexts. Most fundamentally, international 
law lacks the law enforcement mechanisms found in domestic criminal justice 
systems. This difference demands a different set of rules governing responses to 
unlawful aggression, imposing fewer limitations on the use of defensive force than 
under ordinary criminal law, not more limitations, since generally only such 
defensive force will in fact deter aggression. 
 
 Part VI gives a series of examples of international law’s improper 
limitations on the use of force in responses to unlawful aggression, which have the 
unfortunate effect of promoting aggression and instability by undermining 
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effective deterrence. For example, according to the ICJ’s past rulings, it seems that 
victim states may not use force against a state that supports but does not control 
armed groups that launch unlawful armed attacks; or against an unlawful 
aggressor between discrete attacks; or against military objectives that are not the 
source of a prior attack; or in response to a past attack in order to deter future 
attacks.   
 
Part VII suggests interpretations of international law that would avoid 
these improper limitations and allow greater decentralized deterrence of 
aggression by individual states. Again, however, such shifts in interpretation are at 
best stopgap measures. Ultimately, the flawed nature of international law’s 
foundational texts means that reform is required. A specific proposal is offered 
that permits the use of necessary and proportionate deterrent force under strict 
limitations. 
 
 One important opportunity for reforming international law is currently 
being squandered. The Assembly of State Parties to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has recently approved a resolution defining the international crime of 
aggression.2 Rather than confront international law’s existing problems, however, 
the drafters compound them by imposing individual criminal liability on leaders 
of victim states who authorize defensive force in violation of flawed current law. 
Fortunately, the resolution will not go into effect until 2017 at the earliest, when 
the States Parties may formally amend the Rome Statute, which establishes and 
limits the ICC’s jurisdiction.3 There is still time to change course.     
 
I. Functional Similarities Between International Law and Domestic Criminal Law 
 
International laws governing the use of force by nations and domestic 
criminal laws governing use of force by individuals respond to similar challenges. 
One goal in each instance is to maintain sufficient order within a given 
community so that its members, who must inevitably interact with one another, 
may mutually coexist. The use of force by one member can injure others and 
thereby undermine the stability of the community. At the same time, the use of 
force is sometimes necessary to advance larger interests, as when it is used to 
restrain or avoid the violation of rules important for order and stability, including 
rules against the unjustified use of force. In other words, sometimes the only way 
                                                
2 Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties, The Crime of Aggression, Annex I, art. 8 bis, 
ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (advance version June 28, 2010) (hereinafter “Aggression Resolution”). 
3 Id. art. 15 bis ¶ 3.   
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to avoid unlawful, destabilizing force is to use force. But without clear and agreed-
upon rules on when the use of force is permitted, every use of force, even when 
motivated by the desire to bring stability, can create instability. 
 
 One could make similar observations with regard to the goal of avoiding 
injustice. Whether on the world stage among states or on the societal stage among 
individuals, sometimes defensive force is the only effective means by which 
unjustified aggression can be avoided. A just law requires a clear statement of 
when force is justified and when it is condemnable, and a just system authorizes 
the use of force when necessary to protect against unlawful aggression. 
 
 Given the similar challenges faced by domestic and international law, it 
should be no surprise that some important similarities exist between international 
law rules and criminal law rules regarding the use of force. For example, both 
international law and criminal law permit defenders to use only the force 
necessary for effective defense; an unlawful attack does not authorize an unlimited 
response. Such a “necessary-force” limitation seems to advance the goals of 
stability and justice in both national and international contexts. 
 
 Despite the similar functions of use of force rules in the international and 
domestic contexts, Part II demonstrates that international law has failed to follow 
many of the hard-learned lessons of criminal law. A variety of international law 
limitations on the use of force conflict with criminal law use of force rules. Indeed, 
some of the limitations imposed by international law on the use of defensive force 
have been expressly considered and rejected in criminal law.4 Our analysis 
suggests that they ought to be rejected in international law as well. 
 
II. International Law Limitations on the Use of Force that Conflict with Criminal 
Law Principles of Justice 
 
Prior to the 20th Century, the few legal rules that governed the use of force 
by nations were derived solely from the norms of customary international law as 
they arose from the reflective convergence of state practice and opinion. Perhaps 
because customary international law was intended to operate in the absence of a 
centralized enforcement authority, its constraints on the use of force were limited 
to general principles, such as requiring necessity and proportionality in the use of 
defensive force, which enjoyed intuitive moral credibility among a wide range of 
                                                
4 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 22, 46, & 53–54 infra.  
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people and states.5 Early attempts to prohibit or constrain the use of armed force 
through multilateral treaties, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations6 and 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact,7 proved ineffective and were ultimately superseded by 
the United Nations Charter.  
  
 The UN Charter imposes specific limits on the use of force by states, 
apparently on the assumption that the Security Council will take responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security.8 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter lays 
down a broad prohibition on the use or threat of force:   
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial sovereignty or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.9 
 
Article 51 then recognizes a limited exception to this general prohibition on the 
use of force:   
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security  
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105 (2000). 
6 League of Nations Covenant art. 12 (“The Members of the League agree that, if there should 
arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to 
arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort 
to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report 
by the Council. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision 
shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six 
months after the submission of the dispute.”).   
7 See Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (“The High 
Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of 
national policy in their relations with one another.”). 
8 See, e.g., UN Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).   
9 Id. art. 2, para. 4.   
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Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.10 
 
The effect of these Charter provisions is to impose a number of strict limitations 
not only on the aggressive use of force but also on the defensive use of force. As 
explained below, according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), states 
apparently may not use defensive force against unlawful armed aggression that is 
limited in its scale and effects (Part II.A) or against non-state actors using another 
state as a base of operations for unlawful aggression (Part II.B). As we will discuss 
in Part IV, alternative interpretations of current law are possible, and should be 
adopted.   
 
 Other limitations on responses to unlawful aggression, however, cannot be 
avoided through reinterpretation.11 Specifically, the text of the UN Charter seems 
to preclude the use of defensive force against armed attacks that have not yet 
occurred but that are imminent or that are not imminent but are firmly intended 
(Part II.C). The discussion below suggests that these limitations on the use of 
defensive force conflict with basic principles of justice as revealed in and adopted 
by domestic criminal law. 
 
 It should be noted at the outset that some scholars argue that the text of 
the UN Charter and the judgments of the ICJ no longer reflect the international 
legal rules governing the use of force; these rules are instead to be distilled from 
the behavior of states and the decisions of the UN’s political organs. If these 
scholars are correct, then the situation is even worse than we suppose. We argue 
that international law rules are flawed and should be reformed. But if the text of 
the Charter is not (or no longer) law, and if the ICJ has no authority to say what 
the law is, then the very project of submitting international affairs to legal rules 
and institutions begins to break down.   
 
 For example, Thomas Franck famously argued that the Security Council 
tacitly amends Article 51 through its responses to apparent violations, 
condemning some while turning a blind eye to others.12 Franck then attempted to 
                                                
10 Id. art. 51. Note that Article 51 does not displace the two customary constraints on the amount 
and kind of force that may be used, namely necessity and proportionality, but rather alters the 
triggering conditions under which any use of force will be legally authorized. 
11 Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding these limitations is itself a source of instability and 
injustice.   
12 See, e.g., THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 51–52 (2002).   
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project morally intelligible standards onto the politically-motivated decisions of 
the Security Council, as if it was a common law court rather than a device to 
stabilize the post-World War II balance of power. However, despite our 
misgivings about the drafting of Article 51, the fact remains that the text of the 
UN Charter has been signed and ratified by 192 countries.13 How many countries 
have ratified the unwritten amendments Franck claims to have identified, or 
accepted his supposition that the Security Council has the authority to change the 
meaning of core provisions of the Charter tacitly, at will, and on a case-by-case 
and ex post facto basis? None, we submit, that seek an international legal system 
composed of clear and stable rules of general and prospective application. 
   
 Similarly, the ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations, 
created by the UN Charter itself, and staffed by leading jurists from a variety of 
nations. Although the ICJ’s decisions are binding only on the parties before the 
Court, those decisions must be rendered “in accordance with international law,”14 
and are in fact cited as expressions of international law by other international 
tribunals.15 Again, despite our objections to specific ICJ decisions, the fact remains 
that the ICJ is the most authoritative expositor of public international law in the 
international system. It would be a serious mistake to treat ICJ judgments as if 
they carry no more weight than law review articles. If substantive reform of 
international law is achieved, we would want the ICJ to provide nations with 
guidance on its interpretation and implementation. As we shall see, the ICJ 
decisions that we criticize below have a plausible basis in the text of the UN 
Charter. It follows that if we provide the ICJ with better substantive rules there is 
good reason to expect that it will do a fair job interpreting and applying those 
rules. Finally, even if the flawed existing rules remain unreformed, it may in some 
cases be preferable for nations to obey the flawed rules (for example regarding 
non-imminent threats or reprisals) than to make up their own rules.  After all, our 
goal is systematic legal reform, not anarchy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 See Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present, UNITED NATIONS, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).  
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993.   
15 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 524, 534 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) (citing multiple ICJ decisions). 
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A. Barring Force Necessary to Defend Against Illegal Conduct Short of an “Armed     
Attack” 
 
As noted above, the UN Charter permits the use or threat of force only in 
self-defense against an “armed attack.” The ICJ famously held that it is “necessary 
to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed 
attack) from other less grave forms.”16 Force may be used only to defend against 
the former.17 We argue that such a rule results in injustice and uncertainty for 
victim states. 
 
 Criminal law does have a seriousness-of-threat limitation of sorts: one 
cannot use deadly force in self-defense unless threatened with death or serious 
bodily injury. This reflects criminal law’s general proportionality requirement. But 
criminal law allows the use of some force to defend against any unlawful attack—
even non-deadly attacks.18 The bully in the bar who knocks you down and hits 
your legs with his pool cue, but does not use deadly force, can be resisted with 
whatever force is necessary to stop the attack, short of deadly force. Imagine, 
however, that criminal law forbade the use of any defensive force except to repel 
deadly force. Such a rule would seem both unfair and unwise, since the victim of 
the barroom bully would be required to suffer the beating (assuming escape is 
impossible) while the bully would see little to deter his unlawful attack, knowing 
that his victim’s use of even proportionate force in self-defense would be illegal. 
Yet the ICJ’s interpretation of the UN Charter imposes just such a rule on states, 
barring the use of defensive force of any kind or degree against illegal aggression 
that does not rise to the level of an “armed attack.” 
 
This discrepancy between criminal and international law is particularly 
difficult to justify given that individual victims of non-lethal attacks generally have 
recourse to the police and the courts, while state victims of low-level armed force 
                                                
16 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. See also id. at 104 (stating that the I.C.J. “does not believe that the 
concept of ‘‘armed attack’ ‘includes . . . assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons 
or logistical or other support” even though “[s]uch assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of 
force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States”). 
17 A number of scholars have noted this gap in coverage. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION & SELF-DEFENSE 193 (4th ed., 2005) (“Even leaving aside mere threats of force . . ., 
it is clear that one State may employ some illegal force against another without unleashing a full-
fledged armed attack.”).    
18 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.04 (1985) 
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE]. 
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are often unable to secure an adequate response from international institutions. As 
we shall see in Part V, the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism at the 
international level will sometimes justify recognizing a broader right of self-defense 
for states than for individuals. But the absence of such a mechanism weighs 
heavily against narrowing the right of national self-defense relative to the right of 
individual self-defense by imposing an “armed attack” threshold.   
  
The ICJ’s restrictive interpretation of the UN Charter’s “armed attack” 
threshold was foreshadowed by the ICJ’s first use of force decision. On October 
22, 1946, two British destroyers struck sea-mines that Albania had illegally placed 
or knowingly allowed to be placed in its territorial waters in the Strait of Corfu, 
resulting in the deaths of forty-four sailors, the injury of another forty-two sailors, 
and damage to the ships. The U.K. sought permission to remove the mines but 
Albania refused. To avoid further casualties from Albania’s illegal mines, British 
ships removed the mines without Albania’s permission on November 12th and 
13th.19 Even though the ICJ confirmed that Albania’s refusal to remove the mines 
violated international law, the Court nonetheless held the U.K.’s minesweeping 
operation illegal.20 The ICJ rejected the U.K.’s claim that its use of force was an 
appropriate exercise of “self-protection or self-help.”21 The U.K.’s infringement of 
Albanian sovereignty was held illegal even though it was necessary to eliminate an 
ongoing illegal danger and was strictly limited to achieving that goal. 
 
 Imagine the criminal law corollary. A property owner places a bear trap 
on an easement across his property adjacent to a remote state park and rejects 
demands to remove it even after people are killed by it. Would we say it was 
unlawful for a hiker who had a right to use the trail to move the trap from the 
public way? Clearly not.22 Similarly, the international law rule preventing states 
from removing illegally placed sea mines promotes neither justice nor security, 
especially given the absence of any centralized authority that can be called upon 
to remove the danger. What seems more likely is that states will feel obliged to 
ignore a legal regime that is both unjust and inadequate and to protect their vital  
interests. Rules that compel reasonable states to violate the law hardly encourage 
respect for and deference to the law. 
 
 
                                                
19 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
20 Id. at 35.   
21 Id.  
22 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 18, § 3.02.   
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 The ICJ’s overly restrictive triggering condition for defensive force—
requiring an “armed attack”—creates serious problems in other situations as well.  
For example, according to leading commentators, even “[k]idnapping nationals is 
not an armed attack.”23 Thus, according to the ICJ’s reasoning, the UN Charter 
would seem to have been violated by the use of force in Operation Entebbe. On 
July 3-4, 1976, approximately 100 members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
entered Entebbe Airport in Uganda to free 80 Israeli nationals and 25 French 
Jews held hostage by German and Palestinian hijackers of Air France Flight 139 
and their Ugandan supporters. Forty-five Ugandan soldiers, seven hijackers, three 
hostages, and one IDF officer were killed in the raid.24 France strongly defended 
the raid as having “the purpose and the effect of freeing certain Israeli citizens 
who, together with French citizens, were being subject to the most detestable 
blackmail [and] . . . threatened with immediate death.”25 The United States, 
United Kingdom, and Sweden also supported the raid, arguing that it involved 
only a limited infringement of Uganda’s territorial integrity, did not undermine 
the general prohibition on the use of force, and was limited and proportionate to 
the purpose of protecting Israeli nationals. But the Soviet Union, China, and a 
majority of the non-permanent members of the Security Council concluded that 
the raid was an illegal use of force because Israel was not directly attacked.26 
Indeed, according to the ICJ’s reasoning, it seems that the hijacking of a plane 
and the kidnapping of over 100 people did not constitute an armed attack 
triggering Israel’s legal right of self-defense, and therefore the rescue mission 
constituted an illegal use of force.27 Criminal law principles would hold the raid to 
be a well-justified use of force. It is a weakness of international law that it does not 
clearly support the same conclusion.   
 
 Similarly, the “armed attack” threshold for the use of defensive force 
creates serious uncertainty regarding when states may use force in response to the 
use of illegal force on their territory. In its Nicaragua decision, for example, the ICJ 
wrote in dicta that “the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of 
another State” or a similar incursion “carried out by regular armed forces” will 
not constitute an armed attack unless its “scale and effects” distinguish it from “a 
mere frontier incident.”28 In the same vein, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims 
                                                
23 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 295 (2d ed., 2008).  
24 FRANCK, supra note 12,  82–86.   
25 S.C.O.R. (XXXI), 1942nd Meeting, 13 July 1976, at 7, ¶ 43. 
26 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 31–32. 
27 Thanks to Morgan Cohen for helping us sharpen this point.   
28 Nicaragua, supra note 16, ¶ 195.  
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Commission held that “[l]ocalized border encounters between small infantry 
units, even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for 
purposes of the Charter.”29 Neither court has made a serious effort to explain how 
a victim state is to tell whether the scale and effects of the use of force against its 
territory render it an armed attack (to which it can respond with proportionate 
force) or a “mere frontier incident” (to which it cannot respond with 
proportionate force). Such legal uncertainty not only compounds the structural 
disadvantages to victim states under international law, but also inhibits deterrence 
of unlawful aggression at the margins. 
 
 One can imagine the argument in support of such restrictive authorization 
of defensive force: the reciprocal use of force, even at a low level, can precipitate a 
broader armed conflict. Criminal law, however, has developed a legal framework 
that prevents escalation without depriving victims of the right to self-defense, a 
framework that international law could easily adopt. Under the Model Penal 
Code, for example, the victim of non-deadly force may use non-deadly force in 
self-defense, and the aggressor has no right to resist the victim in turn. If the 
victim escalates the conflict by responding with deadly force or force unnecessary 
for self-defense, however, then the initial aggressor may use necessary and 
proportionate force in self-defense. The initial aggressor would remain liable for 
the initial use of non-deadly force, while the victim would be liable for the 
disproportionate use of deadly force.30 At no time, however, is the victim deprived 
of the right to use proportionate and necessary force in self-defense.  
 
 Similarly, the best way to avoid escalation of international conflicts is for 
international law to censure the aggressing state’s initial use of force and permit 
the defending state to use necessary and proportionate force in response.31 The 
                                                
29 Eritrea/Ethiopia, Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8, 19 December 2005, ¶ 11 
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org, 2006 ILM 430. See also id. ¶ 12 (finding “geographically 
limited clashes between small Eritrean and Ethiopian patrols along a remote, unmarked, and 
disputed border. The Commission is satisfied that these relatively minor incidents were not of a 
magnitude to constitute an armed attack by either State against the other within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.”). 
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 18, Comment to § 3.04 at 49–51. 
31 See Christopher Greenwood, The International Court of Justice and the Use of Force, in FIFTY YEARS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 379 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds.,        
1996) (“Of course, one can sympathize with the Court’s evident desire to ensure that a minor use 
of force does not lead to a wholly excessive response. Any exercise of the right of self-defence is, 
however, subject to the principle of proportionality. Insistence on compliance with that principle is 
a more effective and realistic way of seeking to prevent an excessive military response than the 
creation of an artificial distinction between different degrees of the use of force.”). 
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aggressor state should have no right to defend itself against proportionate and 
necessary defensive force, but if the defending state escalates the conflict through a 
disproportionate or unnecessary response, then it should be liable for doing so and 
the aggressing state may use necessary and proportionate force to defend itself.32 
Importantly, this approach to regulating escalation should apply both above and 
below the “armed attack” threshold.   
 
 It is true that uses of force short of armed attacks can often be dealt with 
through non-forceful reprisals or diplomatic responses. In such cases, the use of 
defensive force is indeed illegitimate—but only because the use of unnecessary 
force is always illegitimate, not because of any qualitative difference between 
limited unlawful aggression and armed attacks. Just as domestic criminal law 
permits self-defense against illegal uses of force that do not reach the level of 
“deadly force,” so too should international law permit forceful defense against 
illegal force that does not reach the level of an “armed attack.” 
 
B. Potentially Barring Force Against Armed Groups Operating from the Territory of 
Another State  
  
 One of the most surprising aspects of the international law governing the 
use of defensive force is that it remains unclear whether states may use defensive 
force against armed groups using another state as a base of operations. This lack 
of clarity is particularly surprising because the underlying security problem is 
neither new nor obscure. On December 29, 1838, British and Canadian Royalist 
forces entered U.S. waters to destroy the steamboat SS Caroline, which had been 
used by American sympathizers to supply money, provisions, and arms to a group 
of Canadian rebels that had staged attacks against the colonial government in 
Canada. The Caroline incident is universally viewed as the locus classicus of the  
 
                                                
32 We appreciate that proportionality is not a clear rule but rather a somewhat vague standard, 
and that more precise legal guidance would be desirable. However, the distinction between armed 
attacks and mere uses of force is no more clear than the distinction between proportionate and 
disproportionate uses of force. Indeed, if international law expects states to be able to distinguish 
between mere uses of force and armed attacks for the purpose of determining whether the use of 
defensive force is permissible, then it should similarly expect states to be able to draw the same 
distinction for the purpose of determining whether a mere use of force or an armed attack would 
be a proportionate response. If proportionality is sufficiently clear to guide state behavior above 
the “armed attack” threshold, then it should be clear enough to guide state behavior below that 
threshold as well. It makes little sense to rely on a legal standard when the stakes are relatively high 
but not when the stakes are relatively low. 
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customary international law of self-defense, yet the legal status of the case itself 
under the UN Charter seems uncertain at best.  
 
The ICJ has only recognized two forms of armed attacks as triggering a 
right to use defensive force, namely “action by regular armed forces across an 
international border” and “‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State . . . ‘or its substantial involvement therein.’”33 Leading scholars have 
concluded that “where a state is not responsible for terrorist attacks, Article 51 
may not be invoked to justify measures in self-defense” taken on the territory of 
the host state.34 The ICJ has suggested as much in a 2004 decision,35 and has so 
far declined to clarify its position on this issue.36 As we will argue in Part IV, there 
are sound arguments to be made in support of an interpretation of international 
law that permits the use of defensive force against armed groups operating from 
the territory of another state, but at present the law is surprisingly and 
disappointingly unsettled. 
 
The legality of using force against armed groups on the territory of 
another state is of pressing concern to the United States. In 2004, the Bush 
Administration began launching frequent missile strikes against Al Qaeda and 
Taliban targets in areas of Pakistan.37 The frequency of these missile strikes has 
apparently increased under the Obama Administration,38 but their legality 
                                                
33 Nicaragua, supra note 16, at 103 ¶ 195, (quoting Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 
(XXIX), 29th Sess., Art. 3, para. G (Dec. 14, 1974)). 
34 O’CONNELL, supra note 23, at 320. See also id. at 319 (“If the state or states where the terrorist 
group is found happens to be making a good faith effort to stop the terrorist group and has some 
basic ability to do so, then the victim state cannot hold the territorial state responsible for the acts 
of terrorism and may not respond with armed force on the territory of that state.”). See also Oscar 
Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another Country, 19 ISR Y.B. H.R. 209, 
216 (1989).   
35 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1009, ¶ 139 (rejecting Israel’s claim of self-defense 
partly on the ground that Israel did not allege that the terrorist attacks the disputed wall was 
intended to prevent were attributable to any state).  
36 See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
ICJ 223, ¶ 147 (concluding that “the Court has no need to respond to the contentions of the 
Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a 
right of self-defense against large-scale armed attacks by irregular forces”). 
37 See, e.g. David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, N.Y. 
TIMES at A6 (June 19, 2004).   
38 See Phil Stewart and Robert Birsel, Under Obama, Drone Attacks on the Rise in Pakistan, REUTERS 
(Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/12/idUSN11520882 (“There have 
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remains in question.39 As O’Connell has argued, under the ICJ’s interpretation of 
Article 51, it seems that “significant force may only be used on the territory of a 
state that is responsible for an armed attack on the defending state.”40 Since “[t]he 
only attack on the United States that could give rise to the right of self-defense . . . 
occurred on 9/11” and since “Pakistan is in no respect responsible for the 9/11 
attacks,” O’Connell concludes that “[t]he United States has no basis . . . for 
attacking in self-defense on Pakistani territory.”41 While one may legitimately 
argue that the strikes kill a disproportionate number of innocent civilians and 
create resentment among the local civilian population,42 it remains problematic 
that international law appears to prohibit such strikes entirely rather than to 
regulate their use.   
 
 Most famously, on May 1, 2011, a team of U.S. Navy SEALs entered 
Pakistan, without the Pakistani government’s prior knowledge or specific consent, 
with direct orders from President Obama to kill Al Qaeda leader Osama bin 
Laden. Consistent with her position on U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Professor 
O’Connell argues that the use of military-level force to kill bin Laden on Pakistani 
territory without the consent of the Pakistani government would violate 
international law.43 At the time of her writing, Professor O’Connell held out the 
                                                                                                                                
been 39 drone strikes in Pakistan since Obama took office not quite nine months ago, according to 
a Reuters tally of reports from Pakistani security officials, local government officials and residents. 
That compares with 33 strikes in the 12 months before Obama was sworn in on Jan. 20.”) 
(paragraph break omitted). 
39 Compare Philip Alston, United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Study on targeted killings, 
A/HRC/14/25/Add.6 (May 28, 2010), with Remarks of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US 
Dept. of State, The Obama Administration and International Law (Am Society of Intl Law 2010), 
available at www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (visited Nov 20, 2010). 
40 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing With Combat Drones: A Case Study 
of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN 
CONTEXT [SSRN, revised version Dec. 20th, page 19], (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144. See also id. at 15 (“Even where militant groups 
remain active along a border for a considerable period of time, their armed cross-border incursions 
are not considered attacks under Article 51 giving rise to the right of self-defense unless the state 
where the group is present is responsible for their actions.”).   
41 Id.  
42 See, e.g., David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death From Above, Outrage Down Below, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/OPINION/17EXUM.HTML?PAGEWANTED=ALL.    
43 Mary Ellen O’Connell, The bin Laden Aftermath: Abbottabad and International Law, FOREIGN POLICY 
BLOG (May 4, 2011), 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/04/the_bin_laden_aftermath_abbottabad_and_i
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hope that the SEAL team used only police-level rather than military-level force, 
was ordered to capture bin Laden unless he posed a lethal threat to them, and 
only killed him to defend themselves. However, subsequent revelations make clear 
that the SEALs used military-level force including attack helicopters, explosives, 
and assault rifles; that the SEALs were ordered to kill bin Laden unless he 
affirmatively surrendered; and that bin Laden was clearly unarmed at the time he 
was killed.44   
 
Some scholars criticize the blanket permission given by the law of armed 
conflict to kill opposing combatants, even if they can be safely captured.45 Perhaps 
this is another area in which international law should track criminal law more 
closely by permitting lethal force against an individual only when non-lethal force 
is insufficient to incapacitate that individual. But the point for now is that 
international law seems to prohibit the use of military-level force on the territory 
of a non-consenting state even when directed against the leader of an armed 
group operating from the territory of that state.   
 
 To construct a parallel situation in the domestic context, imagine that a 
gunman is firing on a crowd from a nearby rooftop and the criminal law of the 
jurisdiction prohibits those fired upon from crossing the property line in order to 
stop the shooter. Clearly, no society would permit such a limitation on the use of 
defensive force, yet international law would seem to. The fact is that imposing 
such a limitation is less justifiable in the international context than the domestic 
criminal law context. In the latter, the victim can call the police, who will rush 
over to use the necessary force.46 In the international context, however, there are 
no police to call. No one will come and put down the ongoing aggression. The 
victim state and its allies must either do nothing to defend themselves or must use 
force in violation of international law—a predicament that fails to promote justice, 
stability, or respect for international law.  
 
                                                                                                                                
nternational_law. O’Connell suggests that the Pakistani government waived its objection to the 
operation, but such a waiver presupposes the violation of Pakistani sovereignty.   
44 See Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden: What Happened that Night in Abbottabad, NEW YORKER, 
Aug. 8, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?currentPage=all.  
45 See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Criminal Law and Morality at War, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 481 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011); Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable 
Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 69 (2010). 
46 The victim is not legally obliged to wait for the police if doing so risks greater harm. See, e.g., 
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 18, § 3.04(1), 3.04(2)(b) (1985). 
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 Such legal uncertainty is a serious problem for countries that are 
embroiled in ongoing conflicts with armed groups based in neighboring countries. 
For example, since 1992, a separatist group called the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) has repeatedly attacked Turkish government and military facilities, 
including bombing the Turkish embassy in Strasbourg and carrying out 15 suicide 
bombings inside Turkey between 1995 and 1999. The PKK has operated out of 
the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq since the creation of a no-fly zone following the 
First Gulf War resulted in a de facto Kurdish state in that area. Frequent clashes 
along the Iraqi border with Turkey since 2003 have left approximately 246 
security personnel dead while 1,325 PKK members have been captured. The 
conflict as a whole has left over 37,000 people dead. Turkey has staged five major 
incursions into Iraq since 1992 to combat the aggression.47 Although Turkey’s 
incursions would seem to be in technical violation of the UN Charter, Iraqi 
protests “did not lead to a meeting of, let alone action by, the [Security] Council 
or the [General] Assembly.”48 As Part III discusses at greater length, legal rules 
that are seen as unjust (such as the ICJ’s apparent rule limiting self-defense to 
armed attacks by states) are regularly ignored and only undermine the law’s 
credibility and long-term effectiveness.  
 
C. Barring Force Necessary to Defend Against an Attack that Has Not Yet Begun 
 
The text of Article 51 limits the use of defensive force to situations in 
which “an armed attack occurs.” This permits the use of force to repel either an 
ongoing attack or an “incipient” attack that has begun but is still in its early stages 
and whose effects have not yet been felt.49 The text of the Charter does not permit 
states to use force before “an armed attack occurs” in order to defend against a 
planned attack; it also forbids the use force even against an imminent attack that 
has not yet begun even though preparations for the attack have been made and 
there is clear evidence of the intent to attack and no realistic opportunity of  
 
 
                                                
47 See FRANCK, supra note 12, at 63.  More recently, Turkey has received the new Iraqi 
government’s consent to conduct cross-border operations against the PKK. See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, 
Turkey Deploys Thousands in Pursuit of Kurdish Rebels, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2011, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/europe/turkey-deploys-thousands-of-troops-
against-pkk.html. 
48 Id.   
49 For instance, if a missile is launched by one state against another state, the victim state does not 
have to wait until the missile strikes before using defensive force against the aggressing state. See, 
e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 187.   
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achieving a negotiated solution. In other words, victim states are left to brace 
themselves for the oncoming assault.50 
 
 We agree that the use of defensive force is typically not legitimate absent 
an ongoing or incipient attack, but defensive force ought to be authorized 
whenever it is necessary to prevent an imminent attack. To better understand the 
problem, consider the Six Day War. In May 1967, Egypt expelled the United 
Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai Peninsula, which had been stationed 
there since 1957 to provide a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel after the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. Egypt then closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships; secured 
unified command of the Iraqi and Jordanian armed forces; heightened aerial 
reconnaissance, including over Israel’s nuclear research facility; and amassed 
2,880 tanks and 465,000 soldiers on the Israeli border. On June 5, 1967, Israel 
attacked and substantially destroyed the Egyptian air force.51 Despite mounting 
evidence of an impending armed attack of devastating proportions, the order to 
attack had not been given, no borders had been crossed, and no shots had been 
fired. Israel’s use of force, though apparently necessary, proportionate, and in 
response to an imminent armed attack, was not justified under the Charter’s 
authorization to use defensive force only “if an armed attack occurs.” 
 
 In some instances, states anticipated an impending attack but chose not to 
use force for fear of incurring legal, political, and reputational costs. For example, 
in the weeks prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Israeli government received 
as many as eleven warnings of an impending attack, including from King Hussein 
of Jordan, and observed Egyptian and Syrian troop movements and training 
exercises consistent with preparations for a major military operation. On the 
morning of October 6, 1973, Prime Minister Golda Meir decided against a 
preemptive strike for fear of alienating critical allies, reasoning that “[i]f we strike 
first, we won’t get help from anybody.”52 The same afternoon Egyptian air and 
ground forces struck Israeli positions in the Sinai, beginning a three-week long 
war that claimed thousands of lives and ended in a bloody stalemate. Apparently  
 
                                                
50 Id. See also FRANCK, supra note 12, at 50 (concluding that “it is beyond dispute that the 
negotiators deliberately closed the door on any claim of ‘anticipatory self-defense,’ a posture soon 
to become logically indefensible by the advent of a new age of nuclear warheads and long-range 
rocketry”).   
51 See Robert A. Zayac, Jr., United States’ Authority to Legally Implement the Self-Defense and Anticipatory 
Self-Defense Doctrines to Eradicate the Threat Posed by Countries Harboring Terrorists and Producing Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 433, 455 (2005).    
52 See ABRAHAM RABINOVICH, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 89 (2004).   
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international law expects states to accept similar risks and bear similar losses 
rather than use anticipatory force. 
 
 By contrast, modern criminal law increasingly rejects even the imminent-
threat requirement, shifting its focus from the timing of the threat to the timing of 
force needed for effective defense. Thus, the Model Penal Code drops the 
requirement of an “imminent threat” in favor of a requirement that the defensive 
force be “immediately necessary.”53 The victim may use the force needed to 
defend against an illegal attack before his or her window of opportunity closes, 
even if the threatened attack is not yet imminent.54  
 
 Criminal law scholar George Fletcher and international law scholar Jens 
David Ohlin have defended the imminence requirement by arguing that 
“[w]aiting ensures a stronger case that only the defender is acting in legitimate 
self-defense.”55 However, even if evidence of an imminent attack is typically 
stronger than evidence of a non-imminent attack, it does not follow that evidence 
of a non-imminent attack is never sufficient to justify anticipatory force.   
 
If State A masses troops on its border with State B, this can suggest that 
State A is planning an imminent attack. If, in addition, State B intercepts a 
communication between State A’s civilian and military leaders clearly 
communicating its firm intention to attack State B on a specific date or during a 
specific period in the future, then this is even stronger evidence of a non-imminent 
attack. For example, if Israel had learned weeks in advance that Egypt planned to 
strike on Yom Kippur then, if it was impossible to avoid war through other means 
(including by revealing the Egyptian plan), Israel would have been justified in 
using force before the attack was temporally imminent. To be clear, evidence of 
non-imminent attacks must meet an appropriate threshold of sufficiency before 
preventive force is justified, and states may not act on insufficient evidence simply 
because doing so reduces the risk to their security. However, once sufficient 
evidence of a non-imminent attack is in hand, states ought not be required to wait 
until the attack is imminent simply in order to obtain still more evidence. 
 
 
                                                
53 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 18, § 3.04 cmt. 39–40 (1985); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW 409–12 (1997).  
54 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 18, § 3.04(1). 
55 GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY:  WHEN FORCE IS 
JUSTIFIED AND WHY 169 (2008). 
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 Consider the problem facing Britain in World War II when France, then a 
neutral power with whom Britain was not at war, signed an armistice with 
Germany on June 22, 1940, which provided in part that the French fleet would 
fall under German or Italian supervision. The British feared that the French fleet 
at Mers el-Kebir, Algeria, would be used by the Germans against British ships in 
the Mediterranean. The French assured the British that they would not allow 
Germany to use French ships against Britain but the British felt such assurances 
could not be relied upon given the terms of the armistice just signed. The British 
offered the French commander at Mers el-Kebir the alternatives of joining the 
fight against Germany, sailing to British ports where the ships would be 
decommissioned, or sinking the ships themselves. The French refused these 
options. On July 3, British ships attacked the French fleet, destroying one 
battleship and damaging six others. The French commanders finally surrendered 
the fleet, which remained out of Nazi control for the duration of the war.56 The 
Allies believed that, if they had not attacked the ships, if they had waited until it 
was shown that the Germans were about to use the ships against them, then it 
would have been too late for them to put the ships out of commission. If they were 
to be successful, they had to act while they still had the opportunity for success. 
 
 Similarly, in December 1941, “[t]here was strong evidence of Japan’s 
preparations to invade the Dutch East Indies.”57 Rather than wait for the attack 
or even for the attack to become imminent, the Netherlands declared war on 
Japan. Had the Dutch waited until the Japanese attack was imminent, they might 
have suffered their own Pearl Harbor. Both Allied actions, against the Japanese 
and the French fleet, seem reasonable under the circumstances, and have been 
generally accepted as reasonable,58 yet both appear impossible to justify under 
post-Charter international law. Again, forcing states to break international law in  
 
                                                
56 See Irwin J. Kappes, Mers-el-Kebir: A Battle Between Friends, MILITARY HISTORY ONLINE (Mar. 15, 
2003), http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/merselkebir.aspx.   
57 George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 31 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 358 (1998). 
58 See United States v. Araki, Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(Nov. 4–12, 1948), reprinted in 1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 APRIL 1946-12 NOVEMBER 1948 382 (B.V.A. 
Röling & C.F. Rüter eds., 1977) (“The fact that the Netherlands, . . . fully apprised of the 
imminence of the attack [by Japan], in self-defense declared war against Japan on 8th December 
and thus officially recognised the existence of a state of war which had been begun by Japan, 
cannot change that war from a war of aggression [by] Japan into something other than that.”).  
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order to protect themselves or their allies is not only an ultimately hopeless 
exercise but also not likely to promote justice, stability, or respect for the law. 
  
III. Should International Law Care Whether It Is Seen as Unjust? 
 
Part II illustrates the injustice of international law’s limitations on the use 
of defensive force. In a variety of important contexts, victim states are asked to 
simply suffer unlawful aggression and forego necessary and proportionate 
defensive force, presumably because the drafters of the UN Charter thought the 
Security Council would be a more effective guarantor of world order than it has 
proven to be over the last sixty years. Part V examines whether such rules are 
defensible in a world where no law enforcement power exists to provide the 
protection that victim nations are barred from providing for themselves. But even 
if one were to ignore the consequences of these rules for peace and stability, one 
may oppose international law’s limitations on the use of force simply because they 
are unjust. The current rules too often force victim states to either suffer an attack 
or to break the law themselves by using necessary and proportionate defensive 
force. 
 
 The apparent injustice of international law rules governing the use of 
defensive force is not merely objectionable on its own terms but also undermines 
the stability and efficacy of international law over the long term. Importantly, 
social scientists have taught us something in the past several decades about the 
power of normative forces in controlling conduct and in the dependency of 
institutional effectiveness on the moral reputations they earn. Promoting unjust 
rules, as Part II shows that current international law regularly does, undermines 
the moral credibility of the law, which in turn undermines its ability to earn 
deference and compliance from those it seeks to govern. Reputation is particularly 
important for international law, where the absence of an effective enforcement 
authority leaves the law heavily dependent upon states’ willingness to follow its 
rules because they are perceived as just and fair. In the end, international law’s 
reliance upon unjust rules subverts its capacity to control the use of force by states. 
 
A. The Power of Normative Influence 
 
Consider that, even where there is no coercive law enforcement authority 
at hand, people commonly remain law-abiding. This phenomenon demonstrates 
the power of normative influence, arising from the norms shared by a person’s 
community and from the norms internalized by the individual. Social science has 
come to appreciate the enormous power of normative influence. Indeed, there is 
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good evidence to suggest that even in the context of domestic criminal justice, 
where the existence of a functioning criminal justice system offers a significant 
deterrent threat, the power of normative influence is greater than that of general 
deterrence.59 
 
 Importantly, international law scholars have persuasively argued that 
perceptions of legitimacy and fairness influence the behavior of states much as 
these perceptions influence the behavior of individuals.60 In the international 
context, where no centralized law enforcement authority exists, the powerful 
forces of normative influence may be among the most effective means available 
for gaining compliance.61  
 
Can international law harness the forces of normative influence? There is 
good reason to believe that it can, but only if it formulates its rules in a way that 
earns it a reputation as a moral authority. If international law rules governing the 
use of force track shared intuitions of fairness and justice, then violators of those 
rules will be seen as doing something morally condemnable, and would be 
stigmatized as a result. By contrast, if international law rules regularly conflict with 
shared intuitions of justice, then the rules’ moral authority will be undermined. If 
international law earns a reputation for regularly “getting it wrong,” then the 
violation of its rules is not likely to trigger moral condemnation or stigma, but is 
more likely to trigger resistance and subversion. Each time a state violates 
international law’s unjust defensive force rules, yet is seen as engaging in conduct 
accepted as necessary and proper, international law’s reputation is incrementally 
undermined, and the condemnation for violating international law’s force rules is 
incrementally weakened. Undermining international law’s condemnatory effect is 
                                                
59 See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 59 (1990) (finding a strong positive 
correlation between perceptions of legitimacy and compliance with criminal law); see also Paul H. 
Robinson, Geoff Goodwin & Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice (2010) (submitted for 
publication) (empirical study showing crime-control costs from perceived injustices of criminal 
law). 
60 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). 
61 Of course, normative influence cannot guarantee norm-compliance, particularly on the part of 
states that reject the values of the international community. As Part V.C explains, expanding the 
right of victim states to use defensive force can provide an important deterrent to aggressor states 
that are impervious or resistant to normative influence. Conversely, some states may conform to 
rules they view as unjust because they believe it is in their overall interest to do so. Indeed, since 
the UN Charter is so difficult to modify, many states may conform to its rules thinking that reform 
is impossible and that unjust rules are better than none at all. We believe, however, that reform is 
possible and, if possible, imperative.    
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a serious problem when the law seeks to condemn the states that really do deserve 
condemnation. When the moral credibility of international law is compromised, 
so too is its ability to harness the forces of social influence. 
 
 Similarly, and relatedly, if international rules fail to earn a reputation for 
moral credibility, a state is more likely to feel justified in taking matters into its 
own hands in violation of those rules—what in the private context would be 
vigilantism. In the international context, with no centralized law enforcement 
authority to exercise force to maintain order, this is a particular problem. Without 
a central enforcement authority and with an international system dependent upon  
normative rather than coercive enforcement power, international law rules with 
little moral force encourage individual states to do as they choose. 
 
 An earned reputation for moral authority also could help gain compliance 
from states in situations in which the appropriate rule of conduct is unclear, a 
special problem in international law where there remain so many areas of 
complexity and indeterminacy. If international law has earned moral credibility, 
states are more likely to defer to it in borderline or ambiguous situations. Where 
international law has proven itself insensitive to notions of fairness and justice, its 
rules are less likely to earn such deference. 
 
 Finally, international law rules that have earned a reputation as reliable 
moral authorities can affect the development of new international norms. Again, 
this is particularly important in international law, where many issues remain to be 
resolved.62 When international law formally prohibits certain conduct, for 
example, its credibility reinforces the conclusions that such conduct is indeed 
condemnable. On the other hand, an international law that is perceived as out of 
touch with principles of justice and fairness is less likely to have much norm-
shaping effect when it prohibits conduct.63 Unjust rules can be discounted as 
further evidence of international law’s insensitivity to doing justice, and render 
                                                
62 The debate over the legality of land mines provides but one example of an emerging 
international law norm whose moral legitimacy remains disputed. See Review of Land Mine Treaty ‘to 
Take Some Time,’ State Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A10; Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, available at http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text 
(providing the text of the mine ban treaty).  
63 Cf. PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW:  WHO SHOULD BE 
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 175–201 (2008); Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 
NW. UNIV. L. REV. 453, 471–74 (1997); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice:  
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2007). 
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international law increasingly irrelevant to the public conversation regarding 
whether the conduct at hand is indeed condemnable. 
 
B. Shared Intuitions of Justice on the Use of Defensive Force 
 
How can international law build its moral credibility with the international 
community? A necessary part of that process is to have rules that avoid conflict 
with people’s shared intuitions of justice. Although it has not always been fully 
appreciated, it seems clear now that human beings share intuitions about many  
aspects of just conduct, including what constitutes the justified use of force. Many 
of these core beliefs are shared across all demographics.64  
 
 Empirical studies reveal lay intuitions of justice on a wide variety of issues 
relating to the use of defensive force. Lay persons support the use of force 
necessary to defend against unjustified aggression, even the use of deadly force.65 
(Indeed, lay intuitions tend to go much further than even domestic criminal law in 
authorizing the use of defensive force.66) The same overwhelming support for 
victims is seen in tests of lay judgments about the use of force in defense of 
property. Lay people refuse to impose liability where a victim uses force necessary 
to defend property,67 as one would expect, but also take a similar view even where 
the necessity for the use of force is questionable,68 where there is no imminent 
threat so the defender perceives no immediate need for force,69 and where the 
                                                
64 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1833 (2007). 
65 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 56 table 3.1, row 2 (1995) [hereinafter JLB]. 
66 For example, lay intuitions would justify use of force even if the defender knows that a killing in 
self-defense is unnecessary because he could have safely retreated from his home. Id. at table 3.1, 
row 5. So sympathetic are lay persons to the target of aggression that they commonly also impose 
no liability even if the defender uses more force than is necessary because he is mistaken about the 
threat. Id. at table 3.1, row 6. Reflecting this same degree of sympathy and support, lay persons 
may provide liability but little or no punishment even if the defender knew that the killing was not 
necessary because he could have safely retreated in a public place (the subjects on average reduce 
liability from 15 years in the case of the same killing without self-defense to 9.6 months for killing 
where it could have been avoided by retreating in a public place). Id. at table 3.1, row 4. 
Additionally, lay persons commonly provide no liability where the defender killed in a mistaken 
belief that no retreat was possible. Id. at table 3.1, row 7. Even where the defendant kills an 
unarmed attacker knowing deadly force is not necessary, the defender’s liability is only 5.8 years, 
rather than the 15 years imposed for the same killing not in self-defense. Id. at table 3.1, row 3. 
67 Id. at 56–57 table 3.6, row 1. 
68 Id. at table 3.6, row 2. 
69 Id. at table 3.6, row 4. 
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defender chooses to use more force than is necessary.70 Indeed, even where the 
victim uses deadly force, whether he knows that it is not lawful or mistakenly 
believes that it is lawful, lay persons as a group impose essentially trivial liability.71 
This treatment of force in protection of mere property, especially the views on the 
use of deadly force in such cases, suggests perhaps only modest support for the 
limitations of necessity and proportionality. 
 
 The same overwhelming sympathy and support for victims and intended 
victims of aggression reveals itself not only in lay people’s support for defensive 
force but also in their view on aggressive force used for law enforcement purposes 
after an offense is complete. Lay persons typically impose no liability on citizens 
who use nondeadly force to capture an offender fleeing from a rape or from a 
property destruction offense.72 Perhaps even more striking, they typically impose 
no liability even for the use of deadly force for such capture after a rape,73 and 
impose only trivial liability for the use of deadly force for capture after the 
property offense.74 Indeed, so sympathetic are they that even when the victim uses 
aggressive force to capture but is mistaken as to the identity of the original 
attacker, and uses force against the wrong person, lay people still refuse to impose 
liability for the use of nondeadly force,75 and impose only trivial liability for the 
use of deadly force.76 It is fair to conclude that lay support for the use of force 
against aggressors and law-breakers extends to both defensive and aggressive 
action.77 
 
 Importantly, the intuitions of justice reflected in these studies are not 
unique to Americans. While there is little cross-cultural work on defensive force 
rules in particular, there are many studies showing that many intuitions of justice 
are shared across societies. First, according to empirical studies, “the intuition that 
                                                
70 Id. at table 3.6, row 5. 
71 Id. at table 3.6, rows 6, 7 (subjects imposed liability on average of 2.6 weeks). 
72 Id. at 74 table 3.7, rows 3, 7. 
73 Id. at table 3.7, row 1. 
74 Id. at table 3.7, row 5 (subjects imposed liability on average of 2.6 weeks). 
75 Id. at table 3.7, rows 4, 8. 
76 Id. at table 3.7, rows 2, 6 (subjects impose liability on average of 5 days for the deadly force 
against the wrong person after the rape, and 3.2 months for the deadly force against the wrong 
person after the property offense).   
77 The same sort of lay sympathy and support has been shown for aggressive conduct designed to 
avoid a greater harm (lesser evils situations)—as in the burning of another’s property to serve as a 
firebreak to protect a town—even where it turns out that the actor is mistaken as to the need for 
his conduct. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1124 table 3, rows 6 (justified burning), 9–11 (mistaken) (1998). 
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those who commit wrongs should be punished seems to be universal.”78 
Philosopher Ray Jackendoff adds that “[i]n our culture, the legal system punishes 
not only physical aggression like assault, but also economic aggression like 
stealing. Similar institutions are found in some form in every culture, even in the 
absence of written legal codes.” Developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan 
concurs, including the intuition that serious wrongdoing should be punished as 
one of “a limited number of universal moral categories that transcend time and 
locality.”79 Indeed, this conclusion is consistent across a number of studies80 and is 
consistent with the finding that “[h]arm, broadly construed to include 
psychological harm, injustice, and violation of rights, may be important in the 
morality of all cultures.”81 
 
 Moreover, people “everywhere [also] share intuitions of justice about the 
relative blameworthiness of serious wrongdoing.”82 Within different cultures 
survey data obtained by asking respondents to rank various instances of 
wrongdoing indicate that there is consensus as to the relative amounts of 
punishment those instances deserve. For instance, Graeme Newman, surveying 
subjects from supposedly drastically different cultures, finds, “If one were to order 
the [instances of wrongdoing] according to the proportions of each country 
sample criminalizing them, one would find a general consensus across all 
countries as to the extent that all acts should be tolerated.”83 Looking broadly at 
his respondents’ answers, Newman reports that there is “general agreement in 
ranks across all countries.”84 Later studies—typically building on the work of 
Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang’s study of American rankings of crime  
 
 
 
 
                                                
78 Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 64, at 1852. 
79 JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 118–19 (1984). 
80 See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 64, at 1852–53 (collecting studies). 
81 Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 613 (1993). 
82 Id. at 1862. The reason that intuitions as to punishment are so consistent may be that they are 
derived from evolutionary processes. See Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, 
The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1646–54 (2007). 
83 Graeme Newman, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN 
SIX CULTURES 115 (1976). 
84 Id. at 141. 
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seriousness85—have found consensus between Americans and Taiwanese,86 
Americans and Kuwaitis,87 and Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews.88  
 
That intuitions of justice concerning defensive force in particular are 
shared across cultures is also reflected in the fact that the basic American 
limitations on the use of defensive force—requiring an unlawful threat and a 
necessary and proportionate response—are shared by many other countries, even 
those from quite different legal traditions. Kremnitzer and Ghanayim find that “a 
‘universal view’ of the proportionality requirement is shared in English, American, 
Canadian, French, Swiss, Spanish, Austrian, Norwegian and Finnish law.”89 
Similarly, Islamic law provides an analogous right of self-defense: “There is a 
natural right to self-defense. One may defend oneself from a criminal act that 
poses an imminent threat to person or property, but only necessary force may be 
used. An intruder who might be repelled with a stick may not be shot and killed; 
neither may one pursue an intruder who has retreated and is no longer a threat. 
Violation of the limits of self-defense is aggression and renders one criminally 
liable.”90 Indeed, according to the Human Rights Council: “International bodies 
and States universally define self-defence in terms of necessity and 
proportionality.”91 
                                                
85 See THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF 
DELINQUENCY 263–65 (1967) (reporting similar rankings in different socioeconomic groups). 
86 See Marlene Hsu, Cultural and Sexual Differences on the Judgment of Criminal Offenses: A Replication Study 
of the Measurement of Delinquency, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348, 350 (1973). 
87 See Sandra S. Evans & Joseph E. Scott, The Seriousness of Crime Cross-Culturally, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 
39, 53 (1984) (“The seriousness of violent, property, and white collar offenses were . . . perceived 
similarly by the United States and Kuwaiti students.”). 
88 See Sergio Herzog, Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness: A Comparison of Social Divisions in Israel, 39 
ISR. L. REV. 57, 73 (2006) (“In general, the relative rankings of the 14 evaluated offenses made by 
different social groups within this sample [of Palestinians and Israelis] proved relatively stable . . . 
.”). 
89 Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-
Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 893 (2004). 
90 MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHIA YERUSHALMI, ISLAMIC CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 56 (1988). 
91 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Prevention of Human 
Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons in Accordance with Sub-Commission Resolution 
2002/25, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27 (July 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&amp;docid=45c30b560&amp;skip=0&amp;query
=barbara%20frey (citation markers omitted). Even the proportionality requirement—perhaps the 
most controversial part of the American formulation—has been embraced in some form or 
another across many different cultures. For example, in Germany and Russia, where formerly “the 
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In other words, Article 51 imposes limits on the use of defensive force that 
many if not most members of the United Nations would not impose in their own 
domestic law. 
 
C. Do People Have Different Intuitions of Justice About the Use of Force Between 
States than They Do Regarding the Use of Force Between Persons? 
 
 Some might object that shared intuitions of justice regarding the use of 
defensive force by states differ from those regarding the use of force by individuals, 
and that the former are substantially more restrictive than the latter.92 However, 
                                                                                                                                
weight of authority oppose[d] articulating a formal test for limiting the right of self-defence” 
George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 
ISR. L. REV. 367, 368 (1973), there has been a move toward substantive [proportionality] limits on 
even necessary acts of self-defense. Post-Soviet Russia has adopted Article 39 in its Criminal Code, 
which forbids acts of self-defense undertaken with disproportionate force. See UGOLOVNYI 
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 39 (Russ.) (“The infliction of a 
harm that obviously does not correspond to the nature and the degree of threatened danger, nor to 
the circumstances under which the danger was removed, when equal or more considerable harm 
was done to the interests than the harm averted, shall be deemed to be in excess of extreme 
necessity.”). Similarly, in Germany, “so-called ‘socio-ethical limits’ (sozialethische Einschränkungen) on 
self-defence have been introduced into the legal framework.” T. Markus Funk, Justifying 
Justifications, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 640 (1999). Conversely, in countries that seem to 
have been moving away from American understandings of proportionality “in favor of clear rules 
that ordinary people can understand and apply,” efforts have not sought to challenge the idea of 
proportionality per se but rather “the way the balance has been struck.” Renee Lettow Lerner, The 
Worldwide Popular Revolt against Proportionality in Self-Defense Law, 2 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 331, 335 
(2006). 
92 One might also argue that people simply do not have any intuitions of justice regarding 
defensive force in conflicts between states. A quick glance at the public discourse regarding 
international conflicts would seem to make this claim implausible; people regularly make claims 
about the injustice of one use of force or another, including situations involving defensive force. 
The psychological literature on entitativity explains that people tend to personify a group, 
especially if the group is seen as having common traits and common goals, characteristics typical of 
states. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in 
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437-50 (2005); the writings of Bertran Malle, located at 
Scott Pious, Bertram F. Malle, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY NETWORK (Nov. 27, 2011), 
http://malle.socialpsychology.org/; and the writings of Jim Sherman, located at Scott Pious, Jim 
Sherman, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY NETWORK (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://jim.sherman.socialpsychology.org/. Further, negative groups—such as unlawful 
aggressors—are seen as more highly entitative—that is, more likely to be personified, id., thereby 
triggering people’s intuitions of justice regarding the propriety of their use of force. Personification 
of the attacking state makes it that much more likely that the intended victim state will be similarly 
personified. 
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we are aware of no evidence that suggests that people have two different sets of 
moral intuitions regarding the justice of defensive force, one for individuals and 
one for states. Indeed, we are not the first to criticize international law rules based 
on criminal law principles, or to argue that the same intuitions apply across 
contexts.93  
 
To be fair, it is true that the use of defensive force by states often harms 
both unlawful aggressors and innocent non-aggressors (i.e., civilians), while this is 
less commonly the case in the domestic criminal law context. However, it does not 
follow that the intuitions of justice embodied in criminal law principles are 
inapplicable to the use of force by states, or that international law rules should be 
more restrictive than criminal law rules. In domestic criminal law, one may not 
purposely kill non-aggressors; one may knowingly harm non-aggressors only when 
this is the only way to prevent a greater evil; and one may only impose a 
substantial risk of harm on non-aggressors when this risk is justifiable in light of 
the result one seeks to achieve.94 These criminal law principles are virtually 
identical to the international law principles of distinction, necessity, and 
proportionality that are designed to regulate the use of force by states in order to 
protect innocent civilians.95 That these shared legal principles are rooted in shared 
moral intuitions is suggested by their systematic exposition in traditional and 
contemporary just war theory.96 If international law imposes additional 
restrictions on the use of force by states, then such restrictions are most likely 
based not on a different set of intuitions of justice but rather on utilitarian 
considerations, such as those discussed in the next section. 
 
D. Does International Law Deliberately Sacrifice Justice for the Sake of Peace? 
 
 The UN Charter was intended both “to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war” and “to establish conditions under which justice . . . can be 
                                                
93 See, e.g., FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 55. 
94 See, e.g., R. v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (holding it unjustifiable to kill a non-
aggressor as an intended means of preventing greater harm to others); MODEL PENAL CODE, supra 
note 18, § 3.02 cmt. at 14–15 (finding it justifiable to harm a non-aggressor as a foreseeable side-
effect of preventing greater harm to others); see also id. § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness as taking a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk) and § 2.10(1) (defining recklessly causing the death of another 
human being as criminal homicide). 
95 See, e.g., JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 46, 51(2005).   
96 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS ch. 9 (1977).    
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maintained.”97 It is therefore possible that the drafters of Article 51 deliberately 
sacrificed justice for the sake of peace. In other words, the drafters of Article 51 
might have expected victim states to suffer unjust aggression rather than respond 
with defensive force, with the ultimate goal of reducing overall violence in 
international affairs. While the prevention of armed conflict must be a central goal 
of international law, justice and peace need not be competing values. Indeed, 
international law can best maintain peace by doing justice.   
 
As we have argued above, international law can most effectively prevent 
conflict if it is voluntarily obeyed by states, and international law will only be 
voluntarily obeyed by states if it is perceived to be morally legitimate. It is possible 
to compel adherence to unjust rules, but only where there exists an effective 
coercive mechanism devoted to that goal, which international law does not have. 
Without an effective international police force, international law must gain 
compliance with its rules primarily through its normative influence, the very 
influence that international law fritters away by adopting unjust rules.98 
 
 Sadly, international law gains nothing in exchange for its loss of moral 
credibility. Victim states that want to obey international law may do so to their 
own detriment and to the advantage of aggressor states. By contrast, aggressor 
states that have no inclination to obey international law will target law-abiding 
states and hide behind the unjust rules. In other words, unjust international law 
rules will avoid the use of force only by law-abiding states, not by unlawful 
aggressors. The restraint that international law induces in victims only serves to 
encourage unlawful aggressors and to give them significant tactical advantages 
over their victims. Ultimately, states that are inclined to obey international law, 
but that come to view its rules as unjust, will begin to question the moral 
credibility of international law and will become increasingly unreceptive to its 
normative influence. Advantaging unlawful aggressors and alienating those 
initially inclined to follow the law is hardly a successful formula for reducing the 
use of force. 
 
 It is true that aggressor states often portray themselves as victims, and one 
might argue, then, that broadening the authorization of defensive force might 
invite abuse and result in unnecessary conflict. However, states that are willing to 
misrepresent the facts of a given situation in order to conceal unlawful aggression 
                                                
97 UN Charter, Preamble.   
98 Note that international law can also gain compliance by harnessing the coercive power of victim 
states and their allies. See infra Part V.C.   
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will do so no matter what set of defensive force rules are applicable. Unjust rules 
do not avoid the problem, but only serve to further advantage aggressors and 
disadvantage victims. Moreover, as Part IV.B demonstrates, it is possible to have 
clear rules about when force is justified in self-defense. The vagueness and 
ambiguity in current international law can be corrected.  
 
 To conclude, the enormous intuitive support for the use of defensive force 
against unlawful aggression goes even beyond what current domestic criminal law 
authorizes. International law rules, which impose even greater limits on defensive 
force than domestic criminal law, are likely to be perceived as seriously unjust. 
That reputation for injustice inevitably will undermine international law’s long-
term ability to gain compliance and reduce aggression. 
 
IV. Implications for the Interpretation and Reform of International Law 
 
 Part II discusses a variety of unjust international law limitations on the use 
of defensive force. In Section A below, we offer alterative interpretations of 
existing international law texts that would reach more defensible positions. 
However, re-interpretation alone can go only so far. Some problematic aspects of 
current international law cannot be corrected without substantive legal change. 
Section B, therefore, offers a proposal for reform of existing law. Until reform is 
possible, however, the re-interpretations proposed in Section A may be the only 
stopgap measure available. 
 
A. Alternative Interpretations of Existing International Law Texts 
 
 For each of the improper limitations we objected to in Part II, we examine 
the possibility of alterative interpretations of international law. 
 
1. Permit Necessary and Proportionate Defensive Force Against Deadly and 
Destructive Uses of Unlawful Armed Force  
 
With respect to the threshold for the lawful use of defensive force under 
the UN Charter, we believe that a more permissive but still plausible 
interpretation of Article 51 should replace the more restrictive interpretation 
offered by the ICJ. While Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits “the threat or 
use of force,” Article 51 permits the use of force in self-defense, but only against 
an “armed attack.” Ordinary principles of legal interpretation tell us that when 
different terms are used to describe similar phenomena, a different meaning is 
intended. As discussed in Part II, the ICJ has held that “armed attack[s]” form a 
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subset of “use[s] of force,” namely, those whose scope and effects exceed an 
unspecified threshold of magnitude or seriousness. While this dichotomy is 
plausible as a matter of textual interpretation, it must be applied with an eye 
toward the practical consequences of drawing the line in one place rather than 
another. States may use illegal force below the threshold without becoming liable 
to defensive force and with limited exposure to international sanctions. States 
suffering from illegal force below the threshold must either respond with force and 
thereby break the law or place their hopes in international mechanisms that will 
likely disappoint them. Much depends, therefore, on how broadly or narrowly 
international law construes the phrase “armed attack.” 
 
 It is for this reason that some writers have argued that international law 
should construe the category of “armed attack” more broadly while construing the 
category of mere “use[s] of force” more narrowly.99 On this view, the class of uses 
of force that do not constitute an armed attack should be limited to de minimis 
infringements of state sovereignty. As one scholar observes, “agents of [one state] 
may break into a . . . diplomatic bag [of another state] or detain a[nother state’s] 
ship in circumstances disallowed by international law. In both instances, a 
modicum of force must be posited, yet no armed attack can be alleged to have 
occurred.”100 Dinstein proposes that a use of force constitutes an armed attack if it 
causes or risks causing “serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, 
human casualties or considerable destruction of property.”101 We support this 
view that any illegal armed force that risks serious loss of lives or territory should 
trigger a state’s right to resort to defensive force, subject to the jus ad bellum 
restrictions of necessity and proportionality as well as the principles of jus in bello.   
 
 This more practical reading of the UN Charter’s “armed attack” provision 
would allow victim nations greater flexibility in defending themselves from illegal 
force, accruing the benefits discussed in Part III. Conferring a broader right of 
self-defense on victim nations would not only bring international law into 
alignment with accepted standards governing interpersonal conduct, but would 
bring increased stability to international relations.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
99 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 193.   
100 Id.   
101 Id.   
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2. Permit Necessary and Proportionate Defensive Force Against Armed Groups 
Operating from the Territory of Another State  
 
As we have seen, the ICJ has suggested, and leading commentators have 
asserted, that the use of armed force by an armed group does not constitute an 
“armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 unless the group was sent by a 
state or its use of armed force was effectively controlled by a state. If such a 
limitation on the phrase “armed attack” is accepted, then it follows that Article 51 
as a whole does not permit defensive force in response to an armed attack carried 
out by nonstate actors operating from the territory of another state but not under 
the direction or control of that state.102 However, as Judge Higgins has cogently 
observed, “[t]here is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus 
stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a 
State.”103 Article 51 says simply that states may use defensive force “if an armed 
attack occurs” and does not require that the armed attack be launched, directed, 
or controlled by a state. The notion that Article 51 permits self-defense only 
against a subset of armed attacks (namely, those that are launched, directed, or 
controlled by a state) has no basis in the text of the UN Charter, principles of 
justice, or considerations of sound policy.   
 
 One may argue that because Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against 
the territorial integrity of another state and because Article 51 is an exception to 
Article 2(4), Article 51 must refer only to an armed attack by the state whose 
territorial integrity will be infringed by the use of defensive force. But this is not a 
particularly persuasive argument, and becomes even less so in light of the 
significant drawbacks it introduces, discussed in Part II. In any case, it is equally 
(or perhaps even more) plausible to conclude that any armed attack that originates 
from the territory of another state justifies the use of defensive force—subject to 
the constraints of necessity and proportionality—against the source of the attack, 
even if such defensive force involves the infringement of another state’s territorial 
integrity. The territorial location of an attacker makes little difference to the victim 
under attack, after all. It may well be that an attack could be carried out by actors 
who are unaffiliated with, or possibly only tolerated by, the state from which they 
operate. In that situation, it would be patently unjust to hold that the victim state 
could not act in its own defense, notwithstanding the host state’s lack of relation to 
the aggressors. There is no sound reason, then, that the current uncertainty 
                                                
102 See supra Part II.A.   
103 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ 136, 215 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (emphasis omitted).   
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regarding the application of Article 51 to nonstate actors cannot be resolved in 
favor of permitting necessary and proportionate defensive force against nonstate 
actors operating from the territory of another state.   
 
Importantly, a state that uses defensive force against aggressors operating 
from within the territory of an innocent third party state must plead both self-
defense against the aggressor and necessity with respect to the territorial intrusion. 
As we noted in Part II.B, both parties to the Caroline incident seem to have 
assumed that force could be used against armed groups operating from the 
territory of another state so long as the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality were met. In an apparent effort to reconcile the iconic precedent 
of the Caroline incident with the ICJ’s interpretation of the UN Charter, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) asserts that the British use of force in the 
Caroline incident should be classified not as an exercise of self-defense against a 
non-state actor but as a response to a situation of “necessity.”104 The ILC goes on 
to state that necessity precludes responsibility for a State’s violation of 
international law that “(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an 
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of 
the international community as a whole.”105 Here the Commission is at most half 
right. The British infringement of the territorial integrity of the United States may 
indeed be best justified in terms of necessity. However, the British use of force 
against the Caroline itself can only be justified in terms of self-defense. Similarly, in 
domestic criminal law, if a victim, in order to repel an attack by an aggressor, 
trespasses onto the property of an innocent third party (for instance because the 
aggressor is shooting from inside the house of the innocent third party) the victim 
will plead necessity with respect to the trespass but will plead self-defense with 
respect to the use of defensive force. International law should be interpreted to 
ensure that such a combination of defenses is available to states that use defensive 
force against aggressors operating on the territory of an innocent third party state.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
104 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
GAOR International Law Commission, 55th Sess., at 81, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  
105 Id. at 80.   
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3. Permit Necessary and Proportionate Defensive Force Against Imminent 
Unlawful Aggression 
 
Although we are tempted to interpret the UN Charter to permit necessary 
and proportionate defensive force against armed attacks that have not yet begun, 
we are forced to conclude that such an interpretation is not sustainable and that 
substantive reform is necessary. While a plain reading of Article 51 suggests that 
states may only use defensive force against attacks which are either ongoing or in 
their early stages, many states, UN officials, and international law scholars have 
offered interpretations of the UN Charter that would permit the use of force to 
preempt an imminent armed attack.106 The primary textual argument for this 
position is that Article 51 recognizes the “inherent right of . . . self-defense” of 
each member state, and the term “inherent” indicates that the UN Charter 
preserves the right of self-defense as it existed in customary international law prior 
to the signing of the UN Charter.107 Pre-Charter customary international law, in 
turn, permitted a state to use defensive force if it confronted “a necessity of self-
defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”108 Therefore, the argument runs, the Charter itself, by recognizing 
the “inherent” right of self-defense, permits the use of force to preempt an 
imminent attack, subject only to the traditional limits of necessity and 
proportionality imposed by customary international law. 
 
 One problem with this textual argument is that Article 51 states that 
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defense 
if an armed attack occurs.” The text of Article 51 does not indicate whether the 
Charter impairs the “inherent” (pre-Charter) right of self-defense before an armed 
attack occurs. If Article 2(4) contains a general prohibition on the use of force and 
if Article 51 carves out an exception to that prohibition, ordinary cannons of legal 
interpretation dictate that the exception should be interpreted narrowly and that 
                                                
106 See, e.g., Testimony of Attorney-General Goldsmith Before the British House of Lords, April 21, 
2004, in O’CONNELL, supra note 23, at 293–95; Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary-General, In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, U.N.G.A. A/59/2005, March 
21, 2005, at 33 (“Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent 
right of sovereign states to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized 
that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.”); D.W. BOWETT, 
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187–92 (1958).   
107 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 5, at 98–99; Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive 
Use of Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 92 (2003).   
108 Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox (April 24, 1841), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE 
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840–41). 
2011 / Advantaging Aggressors   
 
178 
the use of force to preempt an imminent attack falls under the general 
prohibition.109 Similarly, while Article 2(4) prohibits “the threat or use of force,” 
Article 51 recognizes a right to self-defense only against the use of force (or, 
perhaps, the subset of uses of force that constitute armed attacks). The fact that 
the drafters of Article 51 did not recognize a right to self-defense against the threat 
of force suggests that they did not accept the existence of such a right. 
 
 A second important textual argument in support of the use of defensive 
force against an imminent attack arises from the claim that such defensive force 
does not violate Article 2(4)’s general prohibition against “the threat or use of 
force against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of any state.” This argument 
asserts that a state does not violate Article 2(4) unless it attempts to seize territory 
or depose another government. Since a state seeking to preempt an imminent 
attack need not attempt to occupy or govern the state planning an imminent 
attack, it would seem that the defending state does not violate Article 2(4).110 
 
 This argument may prove too much. Article 2(4) must prohibit the threat 
or use of force to punish another state for past wrongs or slights, to humiliate its 
leaders, to weaken its economy, or for an indefinite number of reasons other than 
territorial conquest or regime change. True, Article 2(4) also prohibits “the threat 
or use of force . . . in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.” It could be argued that this catch-all provision precludes the 
threat or use of force solely to injure another state but does not preclude the threat 
or use of force to prevent an imminent attack. The difficulty with this reading is 
that either Article 51 specifies the exclusive conditions under which the threat or 
use of force is “[]consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” or it does 
not. If it does, then the use of force is permissible only “if an armed attack occurs.” 
If it does not, then instead of settling the international law governing the use of 
force, the UN Charter simply introduces a new element of uncertainty, namely 
whether a given use of force is “consistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” While permitting the use of force against imminent attacks is an 
important goal, it should not be secured at the expense of the clarity of the legal 
regime as a whole. 
 
 
                                                
109 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 5, at 98–99. See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 290 (2d ed. 2008) (referring to “the general principle of interpretation whereby rules setting 
forth exceptions to general prohibitions must be strictly construed”).   
110 See, e.g., BOWETT, supra note 106, at 188.   
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 Finally, it is possible to concede that the UN Charter forbids defensive 
force to prevent imminent attacks but to argue that the Charter has been 
superseded by a new customary international law norm permitting such defensive 
force. Such an argument is difficult to sustain, since it is not clear that states have 
explicitly relied on this norm to justify their behavior.111 It follows that an 
international legal norm permitting defensive force to prevent imminent attacks 
still needs to be clearly articulated. Despite the best efforts of revisionist 
commentators, the legality of using force to preempt imminent attacks cannot be 
reconciled with a fair reading of the UN Charter.  
 
4. Permit Necessary and Proportionate Defensive Force Against Unlawful 
Aggression that is Planned But Not Yet Imminent 
 
We know of no plausible interpretation of the UN Charter that would 
authorize the use of necessary and proportionate force to defend against a 
planned attack that is not yet imminent. As discussed immediately above, there is 
a colorable argument that Article 51 incorporates a pre-Charter customary 
international law norm permitting necessary and proportionate force to prevent 
an imminent armed attack. However, there is a broad consensus among scholars 
that customary international law did not recognize a right to use force to prevent 
a planned attack that is not yet imminent, despite the recurrent use of such force 
throughout military history.112 Furthermore, there is no evidence that a customary 
norm permitting force against a non-imminent attack has emerged in the years 
since the passage of the Charter. 
 
 Nonetheless, we believe that defensive force should be legally permissible if 
(a) there is clear and convincing evidence that (i) the political and military 
leadership of another state plans to use illegal force and (ii) that state has taken 
                                                
111 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 183–87 (observing that states that use force almost always 
claim to be responding to an incipient or ongoing armed attack rather than anticipating a future 
armed attack); GRAY, supra note 5, at 111–15 (same).   
112 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 184 (arguing that “the right of self-defense consolidated 
only upon the prohibition of the use of force between States. That prohibition was first evinced in 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and reiterated, in clearer and broader terms, in Article 2(4) of the 
Charter in 1945. What preventive war of self-defense was unleashed between 1928 and 1945?”). 
Indeed, when the United States in 2002 announced a policy of using force to prevent non-
imminent terrorist attacks it acknowledged that such a policy represents a departure from existing 
customary international law. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf. 
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substantial steps or performed overt acts in furtherance of its plans; (b) the use of 
force is immediately necessary to effectively prevent the use of illegal force; and (c) 
the defensive force used is proportionate to the harm that would be caused by the 
planned illegal attack.   
 
The clear and convincing evidence called for by our proposal will no 
doubt prove difficult to gather, even through sophisticated espionage and 
intelligence operations. However, it is not our intention to provide states with a 
license to use force whenever they feel threatened. We believe that the level of 
evidence a state must acquire before using force should depend on the relative 
costs of error. One might initially think that it is equally bad for State A to suffer 
an act of aggression by State B as for State A to launch an attack of comparable 
scale and gravity against State B in the mistaken belief that State B is planning to 
attack State A. If that were the case, then a lower standard of ‘reasonable belief,’ 
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ or ‘more likely than not’ might be appropriate. 
However, we believe that a higher standard of certainty is warranted, both on the 
moral ground that doing harm is generally worse than allowing harm and on the 
pragmatic ground that any lower standard would be too susceptible to error and 
abuse.   
 
 Importantly, in this context the plan to use illegal force will often take the 
form of a conditional intention to use illegal force if and only if certain intervening 
events occur. Specifically, the conditions under which the leadership of the other 
state will carry out their intention may involve the acquisition of the capacity to 
carry out an attack or the capacity to deter a forceful response to an attack. In 
such cases, states may use defensive force to prevent other states from satisfying 
the condition attached to their intention to use illegal force. For instance, if there 
was sufficient evidence that the Nazi leadership intended to use the French ships 
docked at Mers el-Kebir to stage future attacks against the U.K. then the U.K. 
was prima facie justified in using proportionate force to prevent the Nazis from 
acquiring those ships.113 At the same time, we reject the use of force by one state 
simply to maintain its own military superiority by preventing another state from 
acquiring greater military power. A state may use force to prevent force that 
another state actually plans to use, including force that it plans to use only after  
 
 
 
                                                
113 Obviously, this case arose within a broader war in which the Nazi intention to use force against 
the U.K. was safe to presume.   
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certain intervening events occur. However, a state may not use force simply out of 
fear that another state may one day form a plan to use unlawful force against it.114  
 
 On our proposed view, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 would not have 
been a permissible use of defensive force even if there had been clear and 
convincing evidence that the Iraqi government possessed illegal weapons of mass 
destruction or was illegally developing such weapons. There would have to have 
been, in addition, clear and convincing evidence that the Iraqi government 
planned to use such weapons in an attack on the United States or another 
country. If I learn that my neighbor has an illegal firearm in his house, I cannot 
on that basis break into his house and assault or kill my neighbor and claim self-
defense. I must show, in addition, that such force was immediately necessary to 
prevent my neighbor from using that illegal firearm against me or another person. 
In international law, too, there is a difference between law enforcement and self-
defense, and we do not here advocate a right of individual states to use force to 
compel other states to obey international law. One state’s violation of 
international law only justifies the unilateral use of force by another state if the 
violation consists in an actual, imminent, or planned attack against the second 
state.   
 
 We recognize that unlawful aggressors may try to claim that their use of 
force is in fact defensive and intended to prevent an imminent or planned attack. 
We also agree that it can be justifiable to legally circumscribe the use of a moral 
right in order to prevent its abuse. However, we do not believe that it is 
appropriate to prohibit victim states from using defensive force against planned 
attacks in order to prevent aggressor states from fraudulently claiming that their 
aggression is in fact defensive. States that fail to convince the international 
community that their use of force was necessary to prevent a planned attack will 
suffer whatever legal, diplomatic, or reputational consequences the international 
system is capable of imposing. Mere assertion is not enough, and reliance on 
fabricated or exaggerated evidence invites public scrutiny and, eventually, 
condemnation. For example, the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor on 
June 7, 1981, prompted widespread condemnation, including in both the UN 
Security Council and the General Assembly.115 The fact that Israel was protected 
                                                
114 Indeed, pursuant to the necessity constraint, states may not even use force to prevent force that 
another state conditionally intends to use if the conditions under which the other state would carry 
out its intention (for instance, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction) cannot be reasonably 
expected to occur.   
115 See FRANCK, supra note 12, at 105–07.   
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from more serious consequences is a result of the political structure of the United 
Nations, not the substantive rules of international law. Moreover, we submit that 
the strongest basis for condemnation was not that an Iraqi attack was not ongoing 
or even that an Iraqi attack was not imminent but rather that there was no clear 
and convincing evidence that a future Iraqi attack was planned.116 We see no 
reason why international law cannot continue to distinguish between legitimate 
uses and illegitimate abuses of the right to use necessary force to prevent planned 
attacks. The fact that international condemnation often fails to deter unlawful 
aggression hardly justifies condemnation of victim states for their legitimate use of 
defensive force. Moreover, if international institutions improve their capacity to 
enforce international law, as we hope, then they should be able to enforce the rule 
we propose as readily as a rule permitting the use of defensive force against an 
imminent attack.   
 
We emphasize that the unnecessary use of force is always illegitimate; that 
the reasonable possibility of effective international intervention or negotiated 
settlement negates the necessity to use force; and that such peaceful methods of 
dispute resolution are typically available in most conflicts. We also reiterate that 
belief in the necessity to use preventative force will often be unreasonable: based 
on speculation rather than reliable evidence, reacting to imputed motives rather 
than clear intentions, responding to subjective insecurity rather than objective 
danger. Preventive force based on such unreasonable beliefs is unjustified and 
should be subject to censure and sanction. However, where preventative force is 
demonstrably necessary, it should be permitted under international law. 
 
B. Reform Proposal 
 
 As the discussion above makes clear, the improper limitations on the use of 
defensive force that we objected to in Part II cannot all be avoided through 
pragmatic reinterpretation of Article 51. For example, as noted above, the 
interpretations offered in support of the use of force to defend against an 
imminent attack, while admirable, are ultimately unpersuasive. Furthermore, we 
know of no plausible interpretation of the UN Charter that would support the use 
of force necessary to successfully defend against unlawful aggression that is not 
imminent. Perhaps more importantly, relying upon a collection of disputed 
interpretations hardly provides the kind of clarity that international law should 
                                                
116 As noted above, states may not use force to prevent rivals from enhancing their technological or 
military capability absent sufficient evidence that a rival plans to launch an attack upon acquiring 
such enhanced capability. 
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provide on matters of force and defense. 
 
 We therefore urge the adoption of a clear legal rule governing the use of 
defensive force, whether through a UN Security Council Resolution or an 
international convention, that will avoid the defects of Article 51. The legal rule 
will over time form the basis of customary international law that will supersede the 
UN Charter. We would draft that rule as follows: 
 
Use of Force in Self-Defense 
(1) Defensive Force. A state may use force to prevent unlawful 
aggression, before or during its occurrence, provided that such force is: 
(a) immediately necessary to prevent such unlawful aggression, 
and 
(b) proportionate to the harm that such unlawful aggression 
would cause if not prevented. 
(2)  “Unlawful Aggression.” For the purposes of this rule, “unlawful 
aggression” means the use of armed force by a state or armed group that 
infringes the territorial integrity or political independence of a state and 
that causes or risks substantial loss of life, physical injury, or damage 
to property. 
 
 The proposed language is designed to discard the improper limitations 
discussed above by clearly stating that any deadly or destructive use of armed 
force triggers the right of self-defense; by clearly permitting defensive force against 
both states and armed groups; and by clearly permitting the use of defensive force 
to prevent acts of aggression before they occur or while they are occurring as long 
as such force is immediately necessary for effective defense. The arcane limitations 
placed on defensive force by the ICJ’s interpretations of Article 51 are wiped 
away, replaced by the customary international law principles of necessity and 
proportionality that have a long legal pedigree and intuitive moral appeal.   
 
V. The Enforcement Limitations and Special Deterrence Needs that Distinguish 
International Law from Criminal Law 
 
 While there is an obvious parallel between the functions of international 
law and criminal law, as Part I suggests, there also are some important differences, 
most importantly the difference between the existing law enforcement 
mechanisms within the two regimes. 
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A. The Absence of an Effective Enforcement Mechanism in International Law 
 
 Criminal law rules governing the use of force exist in the context of a 
functioning criminal justice system of police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections 
to which one may reasonably be required to defer as a source of security and 
justice. While there continue to be admirable efforts toward creating an effective 
international law enforcement and adjudication system, and while such a system 
might well be created sometime in the future, at present there is no such central 
authority. 
 
 The United Nations Security Council can authorize the use of force to 
maintain international peace and security, but authorization of such a “police 
action” can be blocked by any one of the Security Council’s five permanent 
members or by seven of its ten elected members, and member states can refuse to 
provide military or financial support for an authorized action. Moreover, the 
process of obtaining such a resolution is both burdensome and time consuming. In 
the 64 years since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, such resolutions 
have been passed with respect to only two state-to-state conflicts,117 a small 
fraction of the situations in which states suffered or are suffering unlawful 
aggression of one kind or another. 
  
 Similarly, the International Criminal Court (ICC) cannot assert 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression because the Rome Statute, which 
establishes and limits the ICC’s jurisdiction, still does not contain a definition of 
that offense.118 The offense definition contained in the Aggression Resolution will 
not become part of the Rome Statute until a majority of States Parties adopts it as 
such, which it cannot do until January 2017 at the earliest.119 Even then, absent 
referral of a situation to the ICC by the Security Council, the ICC will have 
jurisdiction only over acts of aggression committed by a State Party.120 Most 
                                                
117 See S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1501 (June 25, 1950); S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 
(June 27,1950); S.C. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1588 (July 7, 1950) (authorizing the use of force 
to compel North Korean withdrawal from South Korea); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0678  
(Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing the use of force to compel Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait). See also 
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3,1992) (authorizing the use of force to stem civil war 
in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1244 (June 10, 1999) (authorizing the use of force 
to protect the former Yugoslav province of Kosovo).  
118 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(2), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].   
119 See Aggression Resolution, supra note 2, Annex I, art. 15 bis (3).  
120 Id. Annex I, art. 15 bis (5).   
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disturbingly, even States Parties may avoid prosecution for aggression simply by 
filing a declaration with the ICC Registrar that it does not accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction with respect to aggression.121 Put the other way around, countries may 
avoid prosecution for aggression simply by not becoming parties to the Rome 
Statute; or they may become States Parties but opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression. Finally, any prosecution by the ICC can be 
indefinitely deferred by Security Council Resolution.122 Prosecutions before the 
ICC will therefore depend, at least in part, on the same unreliable UN system 
discussed above. As a result, there simply is not now, nor is there likely to be for 
the foreseeable future, a reliable central enforcement mechanism for international 
law that states can rely upon as a realistic and effective alternative to their own use 
of defensive force.123 
 
B. Implications for International Use of Force Rules 
 
 The absence of an effective law enforcement, adjudication, and 
punishment system for international law has important implications for the 
formulation of its rules governing the use of defensive force. Consider, for 
example, that most modern American criminal codes provide that, before using 
deadly force, a defender must first retreat or must give up the thing sought by the 
aggressor. As the Model Code drafters explain their retreat rule: 
 
To the argument that the retreat rule cedes the field to any group 
of bullies prepared to make a show of deadly force, the answer has 
been that the proper and sufficient remedy is not a trial of strength 
but rather a complaint to the police. If this forgoes a private 
sanction that might operate as a deterrent to aggressors, it does so 
in reliance on the adequacy of the public sanctions . . . .124 
 
 This makes perfect sense in the criminal law context: While the original 
unlawful aggression is injurious and condemnable, the criminal law judges that, 
on balance, the defender ought to retreat in the face of aggression because society 
will be better off in the long-run if the victim defers to the society’s criminal justice 
                                                
121 Id. Annex I, art. 15 bis (4).   
122 See Rome Statute, supra note 118, art. 16. 
123 Note that civil damages for acts of aggression can be obtained through the International Court 
of Justice, arbitral tribunals, or negotiated settlement, but these are all ultimately consensual 
processes. 
124 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 18, § 3.04 cmt. at 54. 
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system. It is left to the criminal justice system, with its police, courts, and 
corrections system, to do justice and to prevent future aggression. 
 
 International law, by contrast, can hardly craft its liability rules based on 
the assumption that a defender should defer to a central enforcement authority. 
To demand restraint without an effective enforcement system is to leave the 
defender and the larger community without justice in the case at hand and 
without a means to avoid unlawful aggression in the future. 
 
 Thus, it would be wrong for international law to track limitations on the 
use of force found in domestic criminal law rules that are justified by a policy of 
deferring to a centralized enforcement authority. Yet, this is exactly what 
international law does. It adopts certain criminal law limitations on responses to 
unlawful aggression even though one of the crucial assumptions underlying 
them—the existence of an effective enforcement authority—does not exist. The 
problem that designers of international law use of force rules must address is not 
that with which criminal code drafters are faced, but rather is in some ways closer 
to that of a system designer in a lawless society: in the absence of an effective 
enforcement system, how should we set legal rules so as to maximize justice and 
stability? 
 
 What can a system designer do in the international law context where no 
reliable system of coercive enforcement is possible in the foreseeable future? How 
can an international law system gain the compliance needed to maintain 
international order and justice, without a centralized body to enforce its rules?   
 
While the absence of an enforcement mechanism suggests a fundamental 
problem, all is not lost. Modern punishment theory offers some ideas that can be 
useful. Two kinds of approaches might gain compliance without reliance upon a 
centralized coercive power, but each requires a formulation of international use of 
force rules quite different from those in existence today.   
 
 First, international law rules might be formulated to rely upon normative 
rather than coercive forces to maintain order. That means crafting rules that 
narrow rather than widen the gap between international law and people’s moral 
intuitions. Parts III and IV have sketched the basic approach, the reasons for it, 
and its legal implications.   
 
 A second approach, which might be used in conjunction with the first or 
independently, is to structure international law rules so as to harness, in the 
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service of international interests, the use of force by individual states in response to 
unlawful aggression. 
 
C. Use of Force by Individual States Against Unlawful Aggressors as an International 
Law Enforcement Mechanism 
 
 There does exist on the global stage sufficient coercive power to 
substantially reduce unlawful aggression. However, the power we refer to lies not 
with international institutions but in the hands of individual states. Could 
international law be formulated to harness the coercive power of states in the 
pursuit of international peace and security? 
 
 When modern punishment theory considers the problem of gaining 
compliance with criminal prohibitions, a common approach—indeed, the 
dominant approach of the last several decades—is to compel compliance through 
the threat of deterrent sanctions. One can imagine an approach in which the 
international law system designs its response-to-unlawful-force rules to provide a 
general deterrent threat against unlawful aggression. 
 
 A number of potential difficulties with this approach come quickly to 
mind. First, modern punishment theory has become increasingly skeptical of the 
effectiveness of general deterrence as a mechanism for compelling compliance 
with a set of specific conduct rules. Does that same skepticism apply in the 
international law context as well, or does the international context provide the 
special circumstances in which compliance through deterrence might actually 
work? Second, even if control through deterrence is feasible in the international 
context, how could international law hope to control deterrent threats of force by 
individual states so as to promote international interests? 
 
1. The Potential for Effective Deterrence in the International Context 
 
There are good reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness of deterrent 
threats as a means of controlling conduct. As has been noted in detail 
elsewhere,125 relying upon general deterrence as the principle for distributing 
liability and punishment in a criminal justice system is problematic for a variety of 
reasons. A threat of punishment for violation of a conduct rule can have no effect 
unless the intended target is aware of the rule and of the threatened punishment. 
Unfortunately, in domestic criminal justice systems many offenders have limited 
                                                
125 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, at chs. 3 & 4. 
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knowledge of criminal law rules and associated punishments, either directly or 
indirectly, and many who think they know the rules and punishments in fact have 
them wrong.126 
 
 The international context presents a more promising situation. States have 
the resources and typically the inclination to know both the international law rules 
governing their behavior as well as any sanctions that would attach. While the 
ambiguity of many aspects of international law can create special problems here, 
states nonetheless have the motivation and resources needed to learn both the 
applicable rules and the available sanctions. 
 
 A second hurdle for effective control through deterrence is found in the 
failure of individuals to rationally calculate their self-interest. In the criminal law 
context, the potential offenders most in need of deterrence unfortunately 
commonly suffer from one or more impairments of rational calculation. Alcohol 
or drug use, impulsiveness, mental disorders, fear, anger, group identification, and 
a variety of other characteristics and conditions tend to either distort the potential 
criminal’s calculation of the costs and benefits of committing an offense or tend to 
distract the potential criminal from calculating future consequences at all.127 
 
 Again, the international context does not typically present the same 
problem. While there are no doubt examples of dictators who are mentally 
unbalanced or other instances of state decision-making that deviate from the 
state’s rational self-interest, the level of rational calculation among states is likely 
to be dramatically higher than among potential criminal offenders in the domestic 
context. 
 
 Finally, even if the intended target of the deterrent threat knows of the rule 
and the threatened punishment and can and does rationally calculate what is in 
his or her best interest, there can be no deterrent effect unless that calculation in 
fact generates a conclusion in the calculator’s mind that the cost of violating the 
conduct rule exceeds the benefit. In the domestic criminal law context, this is 
problematic for a variety of reasons, the most prominent of which may be the 
poor punishment rates for most offenses. It is not the actual punishment rate that 
matters, of course, but rather the perceived punishment rate, but in the criminal 
justice context both are so low for most offenses that the deterrent threat  
 
                                                
126 Id. at 24–28. 
127 Id. at 28–32. 
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commonly lacks significant force. In competition to that, the benefit that 
commonly derives from the offense is usually obvious, certain, and immediate.128 
 
 In this one respect, the international situation may well share the domestic 
criminal justice situation, at least when one considers the likelihood of punishment 
by a weak or nonexistent central law enforcement authority. This is the point 
made in Part V.A. above. On the other hand, when one considers the possibility 
of a forceful response by the intended victim or other states acting on her behalf, 
the possibility of effective deterrence is more promising. With the proper 
formulation of international law rules, the likelihood of force in response to 
unjustified aggression may well prove sufficient to deter the aggression. 
 
2. Harnessing the Use of Force by Individual States to Deter Unlawful Aggression 
 
Assuming that a deterrent effect is possible in the international context, at 
least through the use of force by individual states, how could international law 
induce individual states to exercise their coercive power in furtherance of 
international interests? It might be realistic to think that a central international 
authority might put international interests first, but how realistic is it to think that 
an individual state would do the same? 
 
 What saves the day here for effective international law enforcement is the 
fact that an effective deterrent system does not necessarily depend upon self-
sacrifice. Certainly the state being victimized by unlawfulness has adequate 
motivation to use force against the law-breaker. Additionally, other states may 
come to a victim’s defense, either because of an alliance with the victim state or an 
enmity with the aggressor state. Finally, some states with no interest in a particular 
conflict may believe that resistance to unlawful aggression generally is in their 
long-term interest. Even weak states may face situations where the nature of the 
threat and its circumstances make a forceful response worthwhile. And, in this 
world of interlocking relationships, it is common for a weaker state to have allies 
or others who would help. Of course, if a victim state is attacked by a vastly more 
powerful aggressor and is unable to summon allies to its defense then the scope of 
its right of self-defense may make no difference to the outcome. But if a carefully 
broadened right of self-defense would deter some aggression then it is hardly a 
criticism that it will not deter all aggression.   
 
 
                                                
128 Id. at 32–48. 
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 The point here is that, to be effective, international law need not motivate 
victim states and others to use force against unlawful aggressors. It is enough that 
international law avoid interfering with and undermining the use of force against 
unlawful aggression that states otherwise may be motivated to provide. 
Unfortunately, as Part II has illustrated and Part VI will demonstrate further, 
current international law limitations on the use of responsive force affirmatively 
discourage force against unlawful aggression. The effect of these limitations is 
problematic for a variety of reasons. 
 
 First, and most obviously, international law rules limiting the use of force 
to repel or deter unlawful aggression have the unfortunate effect of encouraging 
such aggression by lowering its expected costs. Granted, when its security is at 
stake, a victim state often will defend itself even in violation of the unjust 
international law limitations,129 but any decrease in the probability of a forceful 
response will affect the balance of expected costs and benefits to the aggressor. At 
the margins, the existence of these limitations can make the difference in the 
aggressor’s decision-making. 
 
Further, and ironically, the effect of the current rules is to victimize most 
those states that publicly announce and demonstrate their commitment to 
following international law. A historically law-abiding state is a more attractive 
target for unlawful aggression because the aggressor can more reliably rely on the 
victim to adhere to international law limitations on responsive force. By contrast, 
states seen as willing to break current international law rules will be less attractive 
targets because potential aggressors will worry that those states may be willing to 
use defensive and deterrent force even if it violates international law limitations. 
 
 In this respect, the current international law rules are self-defeating. These 
rules penalize law-abiders and reward law-breakers, hardly a recipe for long-term 
stability or for building compliance with international law rules. Indeed, such a 
situation is problematic not only because it undermines effective deterrence but 
also because it tends to create a habit of law-breaking. By allowing states to 
legitimize law-breaking in those situations where international rules set unfair 
limitations, international law undermines its own credibility and thereby its ability 
to get compliance for those limitations on the use of force that are fair and just, as 
Part III details. By squandering its moral credibility generally, international law 
loses the only other mechanism (aside from deterrent force) that may gain 
compliance in the absence of an effective enforcement system. 
                                                
129 See, for example, the responses to unlawful aggression listed in the text at note 189 infra. 
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VI. International Law Limitations on Effective Deterrence 
 
Part V discusses the absence of centralized enforcement in the 
international system and the resulting need for international law to rely upon the 
deterrent capacity of individual states to oppose unlawful aggression that 
international law institutions cannot themselves provide. Yet, as this Part 
documents, current international law limitations on the use of responsive force in 
fact undermine effective deterrence of unlawful aggression. For example, 
international law bars the use of force against states that support armed groups 
launching unlawful attacks.130 Similarly, international law so limits the use of 
defensive force that it appears to forbid the use of force against attackers in 
between their unlawful attacks. In this same vein, international law permits 
defensive force against the source of an armed attack but appears to forbid 
defensive force against supporters of unlawful aggression. Finally, international 
law prohibits the use of force against an unlawful attacker in order to deter further 
unlawful aggression in the future. These limitations bestow strategic advantages 
on unlawful aggressors and disadvantages on victims, while missing the 
opportunity to use the coercive force of victim states and their allies to help deter 
unlawful aggression. The right of self-defense should therefore be broader under 
international law than under domestic criminal law.   
 
A. Barring the Use of Force Against States Supporting Unlawful Aggression by Armed 
Groups 
 
The ICJ has held that the UN Charter’s “armed attack” threshold forbids 
the use or threat of force against a state that, rather than launching an armed 
attack itself, gives sanctuary, weapons, or support to a third party that then 
launches armed attacks of its own. For instance, from 1979 to 1981, the 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua, in violation of international law, supplied 
arms and safe haven to insurgent forces seeking to overthrow the government of 
El Salvador. The ICJ denied that “the provision of arms to the opposition in 
another State constitutes an armed attack on that State.”131 The Court held that, 
“[e]ven at a time when the arms flow was at its peak, and again assuming the 
participation of the Nicaraguan Government, that would not constitute such 
                                                
130 As Part II.B, has already shown, international law seems to forbid attacks on the groups 
themselves when in the sanctuary of the supporting state. 
131 Nicaragua, supra note 16, ¶ 230.   
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armed attack.”132 Thus, according to the ICJ, El Salvador was barred from using 
any degree of force to end the Nicaraguan violation.133 The ICJ held that “while 
the concept of an armed attack includes the despatch by one state of armed bands 
into the territory of another, the supply of arms and other support to such bands 
cannot be equated with armed attack.”134 
 
 It is true that, under domestic criminal law, a neighborhood resident who 
gives sanctuary and support to burglars or home invaders who terrorize the 
neighborhood generally may not be met with defensive force by other 
neighborhood residents, even though the support itself is clearly illegal. But this 
domestic limitation on defensive force presupposes the existence of an effective 
police force that could be called to immediately put a stop to the aggression. 
 
 Consider the case of the Taliban regime that controlled Afghanistan from 
1996 to 2001 and allowed its territory to be used by the Al Qaeda terrorist 
organization to train its operatives and plan attacks in other countries. Under 
international law, the use of force by an armed group will be imputed to a host 
state only if the state directs or exercises effective control over that specific use of 
force.135 But if a state avoids direct involvement with specific attacks but still 
provides its territory as a sanctuary, then the host state is not deemed responsible 
for the attacks and the victim state may not use force against it. This is so despite 
the fact that giving such sanctuary to armed groups is itself a violation of 
                                                
132 Id.   
133 The ICJ left open the possibility that El Salvador might have been justified in exercising 
“proportionate counter-measures” against Nicaragua, but it does not seem that these counter-
measures include the use of force. Id. at 127. For instance, a state can respond to the use of force 
short of an armed attack with (i) nonforceful but illegal reprisals (e.g., breach of a bilateral treaty); 
(ii) legal but hostile retorsions (e.g., withdrawal of diplomats or imposition of economic sanctions); 
or (iii) appeal to international processes. 
134 Id. ¶ 247.   
135 See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, 
U.N. GAOR International Law Commission, 55th Sess., art. 8, at 45, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) 
(“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”). Note that the ICTY has 
suggested that overall control of an armed group is sufficient for state responsibility. See Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 1999, 38 ILM 1518, 1540–45. 
In that case, war crimes committed by a state-sponsored militia were attributed to the Serbian 
government despite the fact that there was no evidence of governmental control over the specific 
acts at issue.  
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international law.136 According to most reports, the Taliban did not direct or 
exercise effective control over the 9/11 attacks, nor did they exercise overall 
control of Al Qaeda’s operations or provide them with significant tactical or 
logistical support.   
 
 After the September 11, 2001, attacks were attributed to Al Qaeda, the 
Taliban government refused to extradite Al Qaeda members for trial in the 
United States. The United States rejected the Taliban’s offer to prosecute Al 
Qaeda members in Afghanistan, and forcibly removed the Taliban from power. 
Although broadly endorsed by the international community, the removal of the 
Taliban appears to have been illegal under the UN Charter. Security Council 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which condemned the 9/11 attacks and called on 
states to suppress terrorist groups operating from their territory, did not authorize 
the use of force against the Taliban.137 Nor, according to the ICJ’s past rulings, 
would the removal of the Taliban seem to constitute a legitimate exercise of self-
defense under international law.138 
 
 It does not take much imagination to see that these international law rules 
promote instability and injustice. International law allows states to support 
unlawful aggression by armed groups without fear of defensive force in response, 
so long as they avoid specific direction and control of the unlawful aggression. By 
shielding the support of unlawful aggression, international law only encourages 
the same—and undermines its own moral credibility when victims are compelled 
to violate international law in order to defend themselves. 
 
B. Barring the Use of Force Against Armed Attackers Between Their Unlawful Attacks 
 
Consider the implications of a strict interpretation of Article 51 for 
effective deterrence against a sequence of discrete attacks. On October 16, 1987, 
                                                
136 See, e.g., Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the 
International Law Commission, 6th Session, [1954] II ILC Y.B. 140, 151 (Article 2(6)) [hereinafter 
Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace] (prohibiting “the toleration by the authorities of a State 
of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State”). If the host state is 
either unaware of the presence of the armed group or unable to control it, then the host state bears 
no responsibility for the attacks under international law. 
137 See Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in My Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries 
of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2002).   
138 See id. at 27 (“If the party responsible for an attack is not a state, a state actor, or agents sent by 
a state government, then the lawfulness of the use of armed force on a state where that party is 
believed to be is open to question.”). 
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the Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City, which had been re-flagged to the United States, 
was hit by an Iranian missile near a Kuwaiti harbor. Finding that Iranian oil 
platforms were being used as staging facilities for the attacks against shipping in 
the Gulf, three days later the U.S. attacked and destroyed two Iranian offshore oil 
production installations. A few months later, on April 14, 1988, a U.S. frigate 
struck an illegal mine laid by Iran in international waters near Bahrain. Five days 
later, the U.S. attacked and destroyed two oil platforms belonging to the National 
Iranian Oil Company. Prior to each attack, U.S. forces notified civilian personnel 
of the impending attack and gave them time to evacuate. 
 
 The illegal Iranian attacks could not be effectively prevented as they 
occurred. Missile strikes can come from anywhere at any time. Mines, almost by 
definition, do not permit an immediate response against the aggressor because the 
aggressor has laid the mine and long since departed. Where preventing an attack 
using immediate defensive force is impossible, the only means of preventing future 
attacks is to disable or deter the attackers after the attack is complete.   
 
 Several leading states understood the predicament of the United States 
and supported its actions. The French Government approved of the U.S. 
response,139 while the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, “warned Iran 
against further attacks on shipping in the Gulf and hinted at action if a British-
flagged vessel were hit.”140 Howe went on to state that “[t]here is no question of 
retaliation. It was action taken in exercise of its (Washington’s) right of self-
defence. Any country is entitled to take action in self-defence.”141 In other words, 
the British agreed that defensive force need not be used in immediate response to 
an armed attack in order to constitute legitimate self-defense.    
 
 Yet, in its Oil Platforms decision, the ICJ found that the U.S. response 
violated international law, in part because its use of force was not designed to 
repel an ongoing armed attack.142 As Judge Simma wrote in a Separate Opinion, 
                                                
139 Robert Fisk and Michael Binyon, Iran War Threat over US Attack: Crisis in the Gulf Escalates, THE 
TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 20, 1987, available at FACTIVA, Doc. T000000020051002djak00ask. 
140 Andrew McEwen, Navy Could Follow US Policy of ‘Self-Defence’, THE TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 21, 
1987, available at Factiva, Doc. T000000020051002djal00aln.   
141 Id.   
142 See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 84 (2009) (arguing that according to the Oil 
Platforms decision “[a] defensive strike is only ad bellum necessary, in this view, if carried out, first, 
in immediate response to a particular attack and, second, against the attack’s direct source. In 
contrast, the Court said, strategic strikes in self-defense carried out in an effort to deter future 
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the United States was permitted only to engage in “defensive measures designed 
to eliminate the specific source of the threat or harm to affected ships in, and at the 
time of, the specific incidents.”143 However, had U.S. forces followed such restrictions 
on the use of force, they would have found themselves effectively powerless to 
respond in any meaningful way. Under the ICJ’s interpretation of international 
law, once the Iranian units responsible for the attacks had laid their mines or 
launched their missiles and withdrawn, the U.S. was barred from striking those 
units at a time when they could have been reached. Here international law 
provides a legal shield for unlawful aggressors and thereby serves to encourage 
attacks and to make effective defense more difficult if not impossible. 
 
 Of course, the use of force in between attacks is seldom permitted in 
domestic criminal law. Typically victims can summon the police to intervene and 
prevent future attacks. However, when police assistance is not available, victims 
retain the right to use defensive force when immediately necessary. For example, 
the victim of a kidnaping who has been repeatedly assaulted by the kidnapper 
may use defensive force in between the assaults if the opportunity arises.144 In 
international law, no reliable enforcement authority exists to be summoned, and 
states are sometimes left with little choice but to respond to repeated attacks on 
their own. 
 
 The prohibition of force except during an armed attack is especially 
problematic when the source of the attack is a clandestine armed group whose 
attacks are deadly but episodic and whose identity and location may take time to 
determine. For example, on August 7, 1998, the Al Qaeda terrorist organization 
bombed the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, killing more than 300 civilians. On August 20, the United States 
launched missiles against an Al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and a 
suspected chemical weapons factory in Sudan. 
 
 Although the ICJ’s interpretation of the UN Charter would seem to 
prohibit such uses of force, when one attack is over and another has yet to begin, 
the U.S. action was supported by a number of leading states, including Great 
                                                                                                                                
attacks of the same sort were per se unlawful. Once the initial attack ends, it reasoned, so too does 
the ad bellum necessity for self-defense.”).   
143 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ 161, 333 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Simma) 
(emphasis added).  
144 See 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(2), at 79 (1984). 
2011 / Advantaging Aggressors   
 
196 
Britain, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand.145 French Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin insisted that “[w]herever terrorism is launched from, we must respond with 
a firm and decisive answer.”146 Al Qaeda had staged a prior attack on the United 
States—bombing the World Trade Center in 1993—but international law 
prohibited the United States from using force after that attack to degrade Al 
Qaeda’s capabilities for their avowed next attack. One may wonder whether these 
legal constraints also discouraged the United States to launch more robust efforts 
to combat Al Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and whether the 
protection the law offered Al Qaeda encouraged it in that and other attacks. 
 
 For all of these reasons, the prohibition of force except during an armed 
attack encourages unlawful aggression by advantaging aggressors at the expense of 
victims. Aggressors can discount the risk of attack by relying upon international 
law to shield the costs of the attack to them. The international law rule 
compounds the problem by increasing the tactical advantage of aggressors who 
launch hit-and-run attacks while depriving victims of the ability to select a time, 
place, and target that is most advantageous to them. Moreover, by forcing victims 
to break the law as the only means to protect themselves in a world without an 
effective international law enforcement mechanism, the law only undermines its 
own moral credibility and thereby loses the power of normative influence.   
 
C. Barring the Use of Force Except Against the Source of an Unlawful Armed Attack 
  
The same reading of Article 51 that leads to restrictions on the use of force 
in between attacks also leads to restrictions on the use of force against targets 
other than “the specific source of the threat or harm . . . in, and at the time of, the specific 
incidents.”147 Specifically, it seems that a victim state cannot use force against 
entities that played supporting roles in an earlier attack in order to prevent them 
from playing such supporting roles in a future attack. Thus, in the Oil Platforms 
case, the ICJ held that the U.S. was authorized to use force against the source of 
the Iranian missiles, which it could not find, or against the Iranian mine-layers, 
which it could not catch, but it was not authorized to use force against the oil 
                                                
145 See Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 538 (1999).    
146 Edmund L. Andrews, After the Attacks: The Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A6; see also id. 
(“Leaders from most other Western European nations, among them Britain, Spain and Austria, all 
characterized the American attacks as justifiable and appeared ready to believe Washington’s 
assertions that the strikes were a response to overwhelming evidence it had amassed of planned 
terrorist attacks.”).   
147 See Oil Platforms, supra note 143, at 333 (emphasis added).  
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platforms used to coordinate those two past attacks and that might be used to 
coordinate future attacks.148 
 
 Domestic criminal law rarely confronts situations in which defensive force 
is directed not at an attacker but instead at someone supporting the attack, 
presumably because it is seldom necessary or effective to use defensive force in this 
way. One could imagine a situation in which a victim might use defensive force 
against an accomplice who is about to hand a weapon to the attacker or reveal the 
victim’s hiding place. But accomplices seldom make themselves liable to defensive 
force in these ways and are generally best dealt with through criminal prosecution 
after the fact. By contrast, military operations involve the close coordination of 
offensive and support activities, and often the most effective way to disrupt the 
former is to direct defensive force against the latter.   
 
 The limitations imposed by the ICJ on the use of defensive force against 
supporting entities are all the more remarkable because they seem to deviate from 
the well-accepted law that existed prior to the UN Charter. Recall that, during the 
Caroline incident, the colonial British did not respond directly against the rebels but 
instead destroyed a private vessel supplying the rebels with arms and provisions 
but not directly participating in the hostilities. The Caroline was destroyed at night 
when no armed attack was ongoing and when the ship was not being used to 
supply the guerillas.149 Yet for two centuries international lawyers have operated 
on the assumption that the permissibility of the attack on the Caroline turned on 
the criteria of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality and not on any 
categorical ban on attacking entities supporting but not engaging in aggression. 
An analogous situation existed in the Oil Platforms case. The United States 
responded to a sea mine and a missile attack not by targeting the source of the 
missile or mine, which it could not reach or identify, but rather by targeting oil 
platforms that were being used to plan and coordinate Iranian naval activities. 
Yet, that U.S. action was held illegal under an interpretation of international law 
that serves only to advantage unlawful aggressors, disadvantage victims, and 
undermine the moral credibility of international law as it compels victim states to 
break the law as the only effective means they have to defend themselves against 
future attacks. 
 
 
 
                                                
148 Id.   
149 See supra Part II.C.   
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D. Barring Deterrent Force   
 
While armed reprisals were once the main form of coercive enforcement 
of international law, today states are authorized to resort to force only to provide 
protection from ongoing attacks and not to deter future attacks.150 Indeed, “[f]ew 
propositions about international law have enjoyed more support than the 
proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way 
of reprisals is illegal”151 Since the UN Charter permits the use of force only to 
repel an ongoing armed attack,152 armed reprisals are necessarily forbidden 
because by definition they respond to an armed attack that has already come to 
an end,153 while any future attack has not yet occurred.154 The prohibition against 
deterrent force raises serious problems for maintaining security and stability in the 
modern world of irregular warfare. 
 
 In April 1993, the U.S. government learned that the Iraqi government had 
assisted in the attempted assassination of former U.S. President George H.W. 
Bush.155 On June 26, 1993, U.S. missiles destroyed the Iraqi intelligence complex 
in downtown Baghdad.156 Although it seems difficult to consider the strike 
anything other than deterrent force that was illegal under the UN Charter, it is 
unclear what alternatives were open to the U.S., short of all-out war, to prevent 
                                                
150 See General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (“States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving 
the use of force.”). 
151 Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1972). See also 
DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 198 (observing that “most writers deny that self-defence pursuant to 
Article 51 may ever embrace armed reprisals”); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 281 (1963) (citing authorities).  
152 See DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 192–93 (discussing the permissibility of on-the-spot reactions to 
small-scale armed attacks “by those under attack or present nearby”).   
153 See Bowett, supra note 151, at 3 (observing that “coming after the event and when the harm has 
already been inflicted, reprisals cannot be characterized as a means of protection”).   
154 See id. at 10 (observing that deterrent reprisal “takes on the character of . . . ‘preventive’ war or 
acts of warfare”)  See also O’CONNELL, supra note 23, at 320 (“If a state experiences a single attack 
on its territory and has no evidence of future attacks, then it has no case for military force for the 
purpose of self-defense against attacks.”) .  
155 Alan D. Surchin, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of 
Baghdad, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457, 464 (1995).  
156 Id. at 457. See also id. at 459 ( “Though the Pentagon reported that the bombing was scheduled 
for the middle of the night so as to avoid civilian casualties, three missiles went off course and 
landed in a residential neighborhood in Baghdad. The official Iraqi news agency INA reported 
eight civilians killed.”).  
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further assassination attempts in the future. Unsurprisingly, “[o]nly China 
criticized the U.S. action, which most other states either supported or 
understood.”157  
 
 Or consider the terrorist bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West 
Berlin, on April 5, 1986, killing two U.S. servicemen and one civilian and injuring 
50 servicemen and 180 civilians. Responsibility was eventually attributed to the 
Libyan government. Believing that non-forceful responses were unlikely to deter 
future attacks, and with no effective international law enforcement mechanism or 
effective defensive measure against such random attacks, the United States used 
armed force to deter future such attacks. Ten days after the bombings, U.S. planes 
attacked Libyan air defense networks, two airfields, two barracks, and a training 
camp. Approximately 40 people were killed. Soon thereafter, UN Secretary 
General Javier Perez Cuellar announced that the United States action violated 
international law and the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 
condemning the United States for the attack by a vote of 79 to 28, with 33 
abstentions.158 Yet it is unclear what alterative the U.S. had other than to simply 
suffer such attacks indefinitely.   
 
 Naturally, domestic criminal law does not permit victims of past attacks to 
pursue their attackers and retaliate against them. The responsibility to punish past 
crimes lies with the state alone and individuals may not take the law into their 
own hands. However, in the international system there is no centralized 
enforcement authority that reliably punishes past aggression. The prohibition of 
deterrent force therefore means that states are left to rely upon political pressure, 
economic boycotts, or other non-forceful counter-measures. While such 
alternative responses sometimes prove successful, they will almost always provide 
a less reliable and more temporally remote response to unlawful aggression than 
armed force, with a correspondingly weaker deterrent effect against future attacks. 
For example, after the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and UTA Flight 
772 in 1989, Libya resisted repeated Security Council Resolutions imposing 
economic sanctions and demanding only that Libya release those responsible for 
trial. Libya did not extradite the Pan Am suspects until 1999 and only agreed to 
                                                
157 See FRANCK, supra note 12, at 94.   
158 See William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 421, 467 (1990). Apparently, “even states inclined to accept that Libya was systematically 
targeting US overseas personnel also thought the US aerial strike disproportionate to that threat.” 
See FRANCK, supra note 12, at 90. While all responsive force must be limited by proportionality, it 
appears that international law prohibits even proportionate deterrent force. 
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compensate the families of the victims in 2003.159 Moreover, states need not fear 
UN sanctions so long as they have the support of one or more permanent 
members of the Security Council. For example, Russia and China successfully 
prevented sanctions from being imposed on Syria for the assassination of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in blatant violation of international law.160  
 
 The prohibition against deterrent force also has the perverse effect of 
forcing states to choose between ineffective avenues of redress or all-out war, with 
no intermediate legal option.161 For example, suppose that in the Oil Platforms case 
the United States responded to the Iranian attacks with exclusively non-forceful 
measures. Suppose that these measures failed and that Iran then responded by 
escalating its attacks on U.S. vessels. At some point, the United States would then 
have become justified in declaring war against Iran and the two nations would 
have entered a costly, bloody, and unnecessary conflict. Instead, the United States 
launched two limited strikes and (apparently) successfully deterred further 
aggression. 
 
E. Making Victims Into Outlaws and Condoning Force by Unlawful Aggressors 
 
Discouraging victims of unlawful aggression from defending themselves is 
just one of the unfortunate effects of current international law rules. As noted, the 
rules also promote aggression by giving unlawful aggressors special protections 
that translate into tactical advantages. They can pick the place and time when 
their attacks can do the most damage to victims with the least risk to themselves, 
then retreat behind the protections of current law until the next opportunity 
arises.   
 
 
                                                
159 Background Note: Libya, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm. 
160 See Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace, supra note 136, art. 2(9) (“The intervention by the 
authorities of a State in the internal or external affairs of another State, by means of coercive 
measures of an economic or political character in order to force its will and thereby obtain 
advantages of any kind.”). Colum Lynch & Robin Wright, Security Council Split Over Resolution on 
Syria, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2005, at A13, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/24/AR2005102401070.html. Russia and China have also 
prevented sanctions from being imposed on Iran for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment in 
accordance with UN Resolutions and on Sudan, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe for widespread 
violations of human rights. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 905, 919–21 (2009). 
161 See DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 228.   
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 But the implications of international law’s unjust rules are actually worse 
than this. International law not only gives unlawful aggressors a shield, but also a 
sword. When a victim responds to unlawful aggression with force that is necessary 
and proportionate but nevertheless barred under international law, that response 
makes the victim an unlawful aggressor under international law, against which the 
original aggressor now has a legal right to use armed force. Imagine the following 
scenario: 
 
State X wants to injure State Y. However, an attack by State X 
would be unlawful under international law and X wants to appear 
to be law-abiding and to give State Y no legal basis to use defensive 
force. So State X supports an armed group, which it hosts within its 
borders. The group stages armed attacks on State Y, then retreats 
to sanctuary in State X. International law prohibits State Y from 
engaging the attackers while in their sanctuary in State X. 
 
State Y finally decides that it cannot afford to let the attacks 
continue because they are too destructive, and uses force against 
the armed group within State X. This is a violation of international 
law. International law treats State Y as an unlawful aggressor and 
therefore gives State X a right to use force in defense against State 
Y. 
 
Thanks to international law’s improper limitations on responsive force, 
State X can now launch the use of force that it originally contemplated, without 
violating international law.   
 
The problem is not unique to situations like the one described above, but 
can arise under any of the improper limitations on responses to unlawful 
aggression that we have noted above. Any response to unlawful aggression, even 
one that is necessary and proportionate but that is nevertheless in violation of 
international law’s unjust and unwise limitations, makes the victim state an outlaw 
against whom the aggressor state may lawfully use force. The result is not only 
grotesquely unjust, but also provides incentives that encourage and facilitate 
aggression, rather than deter aggression. 
 
VII. Implications for the Interpretation and Reform of International Law 
 
It is possible to avoid many of the difficulties described above in Part VI 
through creative reinterpretation of existing international law. What progress can 
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be made along these lines is explored below in Section A. However, 
reinterpretation alone is not adequate to provide the certainty and specificity 
required to regulate the use of deterrent force. What is needed is substantive 
reform of existing international law. Section B offers specific proposals. 
 
A. Alternative Interpretations of Existing International Law Texts 
 
 Consider each of the improper limitations on the use of force in response 
to unlawful aggression discussed in Part VI. 
 
1. Permit Necessary and Proportionate Defensive Force Against States Supporting 
Unlawful Aggression by Armed Groups 
 
As we have seen, the ICJ has held that the provision of arms, supplies, or 
sanctuary by one state to armed groups who in turn use illegal armed force against 
another state does not itself constitute an armed attack by the first state. 
Therefore, the ICJ reasons, the second state has no right to use defensive force 
against the first.162 However, even if we accept the premise, the conclusion simply 
does not follow. Recall that Article 51 of the UN Charter permits self-defense “if 
an armed attack occurs.” However, once the right to self-defense is triggered by 
an armed attack, the UN Charter does not say that defensive force can only be 
directed at the source of the armed attack. The terms of Article 51 leave open the 
possibility that defensive force may be directed at those who aid and abet the 
source of the armed attack, or who supply the source of the armed attack with 
weapons and other essential operational resources. Such a reading would bring 
the power of decentralized deterrence by individual states to bear on those states 
that would, under the current interpretation, be free to finance, support, and 
encourage illegal attacks on others. Moreover, the provision of arms, support, or 
sanctuary to armed groups renders the provider at least partially responsible for 
any harm that comes or could come to a victim state as a result of the actions of 
those groups. Given the choice between shifting the costs of the unlawful 
aggression to a state partially responsible for it or leaving those costs to fall on the 
victim state, it seems fair to prefer the former option, and thus to allow victims 
states to use defensive force. 
 
 We propose that Article 51 be read to permit necessary and proportionate 
defensive force against either the source of an unlawful armed attack or a state 
that knowingly provides material support to the unlawful aggressor. Defensive 
                                                
162 See supra Part VI.A.  
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force should be permitted in cases when stopping the provision of arms, supplies, 
and support to an unlawful attacker is necessary to prevent or stop illegal attacks 
on the defending state and is proportionate to the threat of future attacks. 
Similarly, victim states should be permitted to use force against a sanctuary state if 
necessary to compel the sanctuary state to suppress unlawful armed groups 
operating on its territory (or to allow the victim state to do so) as well as 
proportionate to the threat posed by the armed group. 
      
2. Permit the Use of Force Against Armed Attackers Between Their Unlawful 
Attacks 
 
The ICJ has held that defensive force may only be used while an armed 
attack is still ongoing. Yet the wording of Article 51 suggests something quite 
different, namely that the right to self-defense is triggered “if an armed attack 
occurs” and continues to exist “until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”163 In other words, the 
right to self-defense does not end with the armed attack that triggers its 
application; rather, the right to self-defense ends only when the Security Council 
has taken measures to prevent future attacks. The terms of Article 51 therefore 
permit states to use defensive force while an armed attack is occurring or after an 
armed attack has occurred but before the Security Council takes appropriate 
action, so long as such defensive force is necessary to prevent future attacks and 
proportionate to the harm such future attacks would cause.   
 
Therefore, we believe that the UN Charter can be fairly read to permit 
defensive force between the time an armed attack occurs and the time the threat 
of future attacks is eliminated either by defensive force on the part of the victim 
state or by action on the part of the Security Council. Force used after an initial 
armed attack that is necessary to prevent further armed attacks should be 
considered permissible. If an aggressor engages in a clear pattern of attacks and 
either declares that further attacks will follow or refuses to declare an end to such 
attacks then international law should permit the use of necessary, proportionate, 
and otherwise lawful defensive force. For example, if an armed group in State A 
launches repeated rocket attacks against State B, and declares that it will continue 
such attacks unless State B accepts conditions it is not legally required to accept,  
 
 
 
                                                
163 See UN Charter, art. 51.   
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then State B should be permitted to use necessary, proportionate, and otherwise 
lawful defensive force against that armed group.164   
 
3. Permit the Use of Force Against Military Objectives Used in Support of 
Unlawful Armed Attack 
 
If we are correct that, under a plausible reading of the UN Charter, 
defensive force need not be directed against the source of an armed attack and 
that defensive force can be used in between attacks, then it naturally follows that 
defensive force may be used in between attacks to prevent further attacks that the 
targeted entity may enable or support but will not itself launch. 
 
 Needless to say, any military operation permitted by the rules governing 
the resort to force (jus ad bellum) is nonetheless constrained by the rules governing 
the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), specifically the requirements of distinction, 
necessity, and proportionality. First, ordinarily civilian objects such as oil 
platforms may only be targeted if their use in armed attacks converts them into 
legitimate “military objectives . . . which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”165 In other words, ordinarily civilian objects 
must actually be used to launch, enable, or support armed attacks for them to 
become liable to direct attack. Furthermore, “[w]hen a choice is possible between 
several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective 
to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least 
danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.”166 In other words, a victim state 
may not target an ordinarily civilian object that has been put to military use if it 
could prevent future attacks by selecting alternative targets the destruction of 
which will result in less loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
property. 
 
 Finally, states must “refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
                                                
164 Of course, if State B is legally required to accept the stated conditions or responds with 
unnecessary, disproportionate, or otherwise unlawful force then State B would no longer be acting 
within its rights.   
165 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Protocol I].  
166 Id. art. 57(3).   
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civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”167 In other words, a 
victim state may only target an ordinarily civilian object that has been used in 
armed attacks if the future armed attacks it seeks to prevent are sufficiently grave 
to justify causing loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian property.   
 
 These restrictions will almost always compel states to target core military 
targets such as troops, weapons, vehicles, equipment, and bases, rather than 
ordinarily civilian objects which have been put to military use. Generally, only in 
hit-and-run cases such as Oil Platforms will ordinarily civilian objects being put to 
military use become permissible targets, and even then every effort must be made 
to avoid or minimize harm to civilians. Subject to these restrictions, we believe 
that proportionate, limited force should be permitted against supporting entities in 
between attacks. 
 
4.  Permit Necessary and Proportionate Deterrent Force  
 
As noted above, the majority of states and scholars believe that current 
international law forbids deterrent force.168 Yet we have also seen that the 
wording of Article 51 can be read to permit defensive force at a time between the 
occurrence of an unlawful armed attack and measures by the Security Council to 
prevent future attacks. No doubt members of the United Nations assume a duty 
under Articles 2(3)169 and 33(1)170 to resolve disputes peacefully, but given Article 
51 this can only mean that states may not use force to prevent an unlawful attack 
if there is a reasonable likelihood that further unlawful attacks can in fact be 
avoided by peaceful means. It is also true that Article 39 vests in the Security 
Council the authority to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and . . . make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.”171 But if a state that has already been the victim of an unlawful 
armed attack reasonably believes that it will suffer another armed attack before 
                                                
167 Id. art. 57(2)(iii).   
168 See supra Section VI.A.   
169 See UN Charter, art. 2(3) (“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”). 
170 See id. art. 33(1) (“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”).   
171 See id. art. 39.   
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the Security Council takes action, then arguably that state retains the right to use 
necessary and proportionate defensive force under Article 51. 
 
 Thus, the claimed prohibition on deterrent force derives not from the 
terms of the UN Charter, but rather from the narrow interpretation of the 
Charter that has been criticized above, as well as from separate international legal 
instruments such as General Assembly Resolution 2625.172 It follows that if states 
adopt the broader interpretation of Article 51 proposed above and enact new 
international legal instruments permitting necessary and proportionate deterrent 
force, then the unwise and unjust limitations on defensive force identified in Part 
VI can be avoided in the future. 
 
 We believe that deterrent strikes on military targets are best understood as 
a special case of anticipatory self-defense against future attacks, the permissibility 
of which we have advocated above. Indeed, deterrent force is probably the least 
problematic form of anticipatory self-defense, since it will generally be easier to 
show that force is necessary to prevent further attacks by a military force that has 
already committed an act of aggression than to show that force is necessary to 
prevent a first strike. Those who believe the principles of necessity and 
proportionality alone are insufficient to regulate anticipatory self-defense should 
consider adopting proportionate deterrent force as a compromise position. 
 
 We recognize that the use of deterrent force creates a risk of escalating 
conflicts. Indeed, “[t]he degenerating effect of reprisals is probably the strongest 
argument against them.”173 However, just as we believe that self-defense against 
uses of illegal force that are limited in their “scale and effects” should be regulated 
by norms of necessity and proportionality rather than prohibited outright, so too 
do we believe that deterrent force should be regulated rather than prohibited. As 
Sloane observes, “[b]ecause force often proves insusceptible to prohibition, the 
law should focus equal or more attention on regulation.”174 The precise 
framework for regulation is discussed in Part VII.B below.   
 
 As we have maintained throughout, the peaceful resolution of disputes 
must be pursued wherever possible and both unlawful aggression and 
disproportionate responses should be censured. But so long as the costs of 
deterrence are borne by members of an aggressing military force, it is legitimate 
                                                
172 See supra note 140.   
173 Bowett, supra note 151, at 16.   
174 Cf. Sloane, supra note 142, at 107. 
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for states to use deterrent force to prevent future attacks. Our position is not to 
require deterrent force, of course, but rather to allow a victim state to decide for 
itself whether deterrent force is necessary to prevent further unlawful aggression 
and is generally in its long-term security interests. 
 
 The foregoing endorsement of deterrent force may surprise some readers 
since both authors have elsewhere rejected deterrence as a distributive principle of 
criminal punishment on consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds.175 As 
discussed earlier, deterrence is often an ineffective distributive principle because 
ordinary criminals are often ignorant of both legal rules and prescribed 
punishments, discount the probability that they will actually be punished, or fail to 
rationally calculate their self-interest. In international affairs, by contrast, 
deterrent force can send a fairly clear deterrent signal (namely, “don’t attack us 
again or we will retaliate again”) to unlawful aggressors who are at least capable of 
rationally managing their self-interest.   
 
 Similarly, from a nonconsequentialist perspective, it is morally illegitimate 
to punish an innocent criminal defendant in order to deter others; this is the 
famous ‘scapegoating’ objection to general deterrence. The scapegoating 
objection works because, except in cases of strict or absolute liability, the only way 
to become liable to punishment is to morally deserve punishment. By contrast, 
being subject to the use of necessary defensive force does not depend on moral 
desert: defensive force may be used against an “innocent aggressor” who is insane, 
under duress, or acting on the basis of a reasonable mistake of fact.176 Similarly, 
combatants are properly subject to defensive force even if they are neither 
deserving of nor liable to punishment.177 There is therefore no contradiction 
between rejecting deterrence as distributive principle of criminal punishment and 
defending deterrent force as a form of legitimate self-defense. 
 
 
                                                
175 See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Legitimacy as Strategy, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 57–59 
(Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009); Paul H. Robinson, The Difficulties of Deterrence as a Distributive 
Principle, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 105–16 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009).   
176 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher & Luis E. Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Psychotic Aggressor, in CRIMINAL 
LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 175, at 365–72.   
177 The permissibility of using defensive force against particular soldiers does not depend on their 
individual contributions to acts of aggression but rather on their status as combatants. Cf. WALZER, 
supra note 96, at 138 (observing that “once war has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any 
time”).  For this reason, we believe that deterrent force may target either the military units 
involved in prior acts of aggression or different military units of the same armed force.  
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 We fully accept the legal prohibition on deterrent force against a civilian 
population.178 Intentionally killing or injuring civilians as a means of compelling a 
government or armed group to change its behavior is morally impermissible, and 
indeed constitutes the moral wrong of terrorism. Civilians who do not take direct 
part in hostilities have done nothing to morally deserve to be harmed or to 
become liable to defensive force. Intentionally harming civilians in order to deter 
their government or armed groups from launching armed attacks is therefore akin 
to intentionally punishing an innocent scapegoat in order to deter crime, which 
even most consequentialists concede should not be legally permissible. Indeed, 
any general or specific deterrence that might be achieved by permitting such 
conduct would be outweighed by the damage its permissibility would do to the 
moral credibility of international law. Finally, it is possible that deterrent force 
against civilians is more likely to result in escalation than deterrence, since such 
force seems likely to trigger a vengeful emotional response rather than a cool 
deliberative weighing of costs and benefits. 
 
 The permissibility of deterrent force against non-military government 
facilities and government-owned commercial property presents a closer question. 
Suppose for a moment that the Iranian oil platforms were no longer being used to 
coordinate or launch attacks against the United States and its allies, but that the 
United States had good reason to believe that destroying those platforms would 
nonetheless deter future Iranian attacks. Indeed, it appears that U.S. forces 
targeted at least one oil platform that had not been used in a prior attack as what 
the ICJ condemned as “a target of opportunity.”179 Even if U.S. forces ensured 
that civilians were evacuated from the platforms, international law would forbid 
their destruction since the platforms would not constitute legitimate military 
objectives but rather civilian objects that are not liable to direct attack.180 
Similarly, if the United States had good reason to believe that destroying oil fields  
 
 
                                                
178 See Protocol I, supra note 165, art. 51(6) (“Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by 
way of reprisals are prohibited.”).   
179 See Sloane, supra note 142, ¶ 76.   
180 See Protocol I, supra note 165, art. 52(1) (“Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of 
reprisals.”) & 52(2) (“[M]ilitary objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage.”). In the scenario discussed, the platforms no longer make an effective 
contribution to military action and it is therefore irrelevant that their destruction offers a definite 
military advantage (namely deterrence).   
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owned by the Iranian government would deter future Iranian attacks, U.S. forces 
would nevertheless be prohibited from targeting those oil fields.181 
 
 The deterrent effect of using force against such non-military government 
targets may be significant, but before altering the jus in bello principle of distinction 
to permit direct attacks against such facilities, one should compare the range of 
permissible uses of such a right against the range of impermissible abuses of such a 
right, as well as the difficulty of enforcing the boundary between the two. First, 
deterrent force against non-military government targets will generally violate in 
bello necessity since a similar deterrent effect can typically be achieved by selecting 
a different target the destruction of which would result in less loss of life or injury 
to civilians as well as less damage to civilian property. Second, deterrent force 
against such targets will generally violate in bello proportionality since the 
anticipated loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian property must be 
weighed against the “concrete and direct overall military advantage” sought; the 
deterrence of a future attack by destroying an object that will not be used to 
launch or facilitate the attack, may be too remote and indirect an advantage to 
justify loss of life or injury to civilians not taking direct part in hostilities. Only in 
rare cases, in which loss of life and injury to civilians can be avoided entirely, 
could these jus in bello principles be satisfied. By contrast, making non-military 
government facilities into legitimate targets could open the door to attacks on any 
government facility from ministries to embassies, airports to police departments, 
welfare agencies to courthouses.   
 
Certainly, it is not plausible to think that every government employee 
assumes the risk that he or she will be threatened, injured, or killed in retaliation 
for an armed attack launched by his or her government. Moreover, the 
permissibility of attacking such facilities would apply not only to isolated acts of 
self-defense, which could be thoroughly investigated and evaluated for their 
compliance with both ad bellum and in bello principles of necessity and 
proportionality, but also to the conduct of war itself, in which such fact-intensive 
inquiries into possible abuses are often impossible. Given such a marginal benefit 
to changing the laws of war, compared with a significant risk of abuse, it seems 
desirable to retain the current blanket prohibition on deterrent force against non-
military objectives. 
 
                                                
181 The use of force against oil platforms and oil fields may also implicate the duty to take care to 
protect the natural environment from “widespread, long-term and severe damage.” Protocol I, 
supra note 165, art. 55(1).   
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B.  Reform Proposals 
 
For the reasons above, we believe that Article 51 can be fairly interpreted 
to permit deterrent force, defensive force in between attacks, and defensive force 
against states and other entities that support acts of aggression. Even a fair 
reinterpretation of the UN Charter, however, cannot provide the clarity and 
specificity necessary to regulate the use of such defensive force. We therefore 
propose several reforms of international law. 
 
 First, we would supplement the language proposed in Section IV.B for an 
international law rule governing the use of force to be adopted through a UN 
Security Council resolution or international convention, with the italicized 
language as follows:   
 
Use of Force in Self-Defense  
(1) Defensive Force. A state may use force to prevent 
unlawful aggression, before or during its occurrence, 
provided that such force is: 
(a) immediately necessary to prevent such unlawful 
aggression, and 
(b) proportionate to the harm that such unlawful 
aggression would cause if not prevented. 
(2) “Unlawful Aggression.” For the purposes of this rule, 
“unlawful aggression” means the threat or use of armed 
force by a state or armed group that infringes the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a state and that 
involves substantial loss of life, physical injury, or damage 
to property. 
(3) Deterrent Force. A state may use force in response to a prior act of 
unlawful aggression, provided that such force is: 
(a) necessary to deter further acts of unlawful aggression, 
(b) proportionate to the unlawful aggression, and 
(c) used before the Security Council takes measures that will 
maintain international peace and security. 
(4) Permissible Targets. The use of force authorized under this section 
may be directed at the state or armed group that is or will be the source 
of the unlawful armed aggression, at a state or armed group that 
provides military equipment, training, financial support, sanctuary, or 
other resources to such aggressor, or at a state that allows the use of its 
territory knowing that the recipient will undertake unlawful aggression. 
(5) Report. Force used under this section shall be immediately reported 
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to the Security Council and this report shall include a clear statement of 
the evidence that unlawful aggression has occurred or will occur unless 
such force is used. 
 
 We recognize that the authorization of deterrent force under section (3) 
creates a risk of escalation. However, we believe that the risk of escalation can be 
controlled without resorting to wholesale prohibition of deterrent force. It will be 
in each victim state’s interest to realistically evaluate the likelihood of escalation. A 
state may have a right to use deterrent force under section (3), yet calculate that 
their interests are better served by not exercising that right. The point is, however, 
that they ought to have that option if such force is necessary to prevent future 
unlawful aggression.   
 
 Importantly, international law permits the use of “wartime” or 
“belligerent” force during armed conflict in order to deter repeated violations of 
the Law of International Armed Conflict (LOIAC). For example, if States A and B 
are at war with one another and during that war State A uses illegal weapons 
against soldiers of State B, then international law permits State B to use the same 
or similar illegal weapons against soldiers of State A. However, the LOIAC also 
imposes strict requirements on states seeking to engage in belligerent reprisals. 
The Red Cross articulates five such conditions:   
 
(i) Purpose of reprisals. Reprisals may only be taken in reaction to a 
prior serious violation of international humanitarian law, and only 
for the purpose of inducing the adversary to comply with the law. . 
. .     
(ii) Measure of last resort. Reprisals may only be carried out as a 
measure of last resort, when no other lawful measures are available 
to induce the adversary to respect the law. . . .  
(iii) Proportionality. Reprisal action must be proportionate to the 
violation it aims to stop. . . .   
(iv) Decision at the highest level of government. The decision to 
resort to reprisals must be taken at the highest level of government. 
. . .  
(v) Termination. Reprisal action must cease as soon as the 
adversary complies with the law.182     
                                                
182 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 515–18 (2005). The Red Cross asserts that “[i]n the course of the many 
armed conflicts that have marked the past two decades, belligerent reprisals have not been resorted 
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Yoram Dinstein, a leading IHL scholar, identifies five overlapping conditions:   
 
(i) Protests or other attempts to secure compliance of the enemy 
with LOIAC must be taken first (unless their fruitlessness ‘is 
apparent from the outset’). 
(ii) A warning must generally be issued before resort to belligerent 
reprisals. 
(iii) Belligerent reprisals must always be proportionate to the 
original violation of LOIAC. 
(iv) The decision to launch belligerent reprisals cannot be taken by 
an individual combatant, and must be left to a higher authority. 
(v) Once the enemy desists from its breach of LOIAC, belligerent 
reprisals must be terminated.183 
 
Dinstein’s first and second conditions are corollaries of the requirement that 
reprisals be used as a last resort, while the deterrent purpose of reprisals is 
assumed and only the constraints on that purpose examined. In short, then, 
belligerent reprisals should be necessary and proportionate responses to illegal 
attacks and should be designed to deter future illegal attacks; they should be 
public and follow warnings to enhance deterrence and accountability; and they 
should be authorized by politically accountable leaders who can best weigh the 
risk of escalation against the risk of future attack. These guidelines are designed to 
guide the use of deterrent force in the conduct of hostilities. They seem equally 
capable of guiding the use of deterrent force in response to unlawful aggression. 
Moreover, these restrictions on belligerent reprisals have been widely adopted by 
leading states as legitimate constraints on their conduct of hostilities.184 Finally, it  
 
                                                                                                                                
to . . . [except during] the Iran–Iraq War, where such measures were severely criticised by the UN 
Security Council and UN Secretary-General.” Id. at 513. The Red Cross then opines that “[t]he 
reticence of States to resort to reprisals can be explained by the fact that they are ineffective as a 
means of enforcement, in particular because reprisals risk leading to an escalation of violations.” 
Id. at 514. As we discuss in the body of this section, the risk of escalation should give any state 
pause before resorting to reprisals. However, we believe that states should have the right to weigh 
the risk of escalation against the risks involved in other available alternatives.    
183 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 221 (2004). Cf. Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of 
Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 415, 441–42 (1969) (proposing similar criteria for reasonable reprisals 
in response to acts of aggression).  
184 See, e.g., Air Force Pamphlet 36-2241, Section 6.9.2., at 114, available at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afpam36-2241.pdf. 
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is important to note that the use of reprisals against civilians and civilian objects is 
and should remain unlawful.185   
 
 We propose similar restrictions on the use of the deterrent force 
authorized under section (3) above. We would add to section (3) an additional 
subsection, (d), as follows:   
 
 (d) Special Restrictions on Use of Deterrent Force 
(i) Non-Force Alternative Preferred. Before undertaking the use of 
deterrent force, a state must enter a protest or otherwise attempt to 
secure a credible assurance that the unlawful aggression will not be 
repeated, unless the fruitlessness of such an appeal is apparent from the 
outset. 
(ii) Acknowledgment. Before or immediately after undertaking the use 
of deterrent force, a statement must be publicly issued, acknowledging 
that deterrent force will be or was used and identifying the act of 
unlawful aggression to which it is a response. 
(iii) Proportionality. The use of deterrent force must be proportionate to 
the act of unlawful aggression to which it responds. 
(iv) Decision by Higher Authority. The decision to use deterrent force 
cannot be taken by an individual combatant, and must be left to a 
higher authority. 
(v) Termination Following Assurance. Once the unlawful aggressor 
provides a credible assurance that the aggression will not be repeated, 
use of deterrent force must be terminated. 
 
 Our proposal uses the phrase “deterrent force” rather than the more 
traditional phrase “deterrent reprisal” because the term “reprisal” has as part of 
its common meaning the infliction of suffering as punishment for a past harm that 
is at least as harmful as the earlier injury.186 Our requirement, in contrast, does 
not necessarily authorize force that would cause the extent of harm caused by the 
initial aggressor.187 The use of force authorized here is only that amount necessary 
                                                
185 See Protocol I, supra note 165, arts. 51(6) (“Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by 
way of reprisals are prohibited.”) & 52(1) (“Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of 
reprisals.”).    
186 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, OFFICE EDITION 585 (1983) (defining 
“reprisal” as “Retaliation for an injury with the intent of inflicting at least as much injury in 
return”). 
187 We find the traditional phrase “deterrent reprisal” misleading or at least dangerously 
ambiguous on this point and suggest that it be avoided whenever possible. 
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to deter a future attack. If that can be done by causing less harm than the harm 
caused by the initial aggressor, then no more than that lesser amount is 
authorized.188 
 
 Notice that the use of deterrent force, under section (3), must be 
proportionate to the act of unlawful aggression to which it responds. By contrast, 
defensive force intended to prevent unlawful aggression by destroying the capacity 
of the opposing party to engage in further unlawful aggression, under section (1), 
need only be proportionate to the harm that such further unlawful aggression 
would cause if not prevented. In other words, the use of deterrent force is limited 
by a backward-looking conception of proportionality, while use of defensive force 
is limited by a forward-looking conception of proportionality. This dichotomy is in 
keeping with the criminal law principles that, while we may not ethically deter 
crime by punishing an individual offender more than he or she deserves for his or 
her past offenses, we may prevent an aggressor from committing a crime by using 
force proportionate to that which the aggressor intends to use against us. 
However, the primary reason to require that deterrent force be proportionate to 
past aggression, rather than to anticipated future aggression, is to prevent 
escalation. The use of force can cause fear or anger, and may deter or incite. For 
that reason, deterrent force should be limited in scale and gravity to the scale and 
gravity of the unlawful attacks to which they respond.   
 
VIII. The Aggression Resolution: Giving Teeth to the Injustices of Current Law 
 
 The Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court is 
currently developing an amendment to the Rome Statute (the treaty that 
established the ICC and identifies the crimes that it may prosecute and punish) 
that will define a crime of aggression for which political and military leaders may 
be held individually criminally liable. This amendment could do much to move 
the law toward clear and sensible rules governing the use of force, and we applaud 
the effort. The previous parts have shown how the improper limitations that 
international law places on the use of defensive force undermine its own moral 
credibility and fail to harness the power of decentralized deterrence against 
unlawful aggression. We have shown how reinterpretations and reforms of current 
law could avoid these problems, empowering victims and discouraging aggression. 
It is true that reform of international law rules is often difficult to achieve, and 
some readers may think it unrealistic to expect any serious reform in the 
                                                
188 This may occur when the original attacker is weaker or more vulnerable than the victim, as 
seems to increasingly be the case in the contemporary era of asymmetrical conflicts. 
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foreseeable future. However, the amendment of the Rome Statute provides an 
important opportunity to begin the needed reforms.   
 
 Tragically, the amendment process has moved in the wrong direction. 
Rather than taking this unique opportunity to fix the flaws in current law, the 
current Aggression Resolution enshrines international law’s current flawed rules. 
Worse, if adopted as a formal amendment, it would for the first time impose 
individual criminal liability on leaders who authorize force, even proportional 
force necessary to defend against unlawful aggression, in violation of those flawed 
rules. If the current Aggression Resolution is adopted, leaders will be criminally 
liable for authorizing rescue operations like the one at Entebbe, military 
operations against armed groups like the PKK, preventive strikes like the sinking 
of the French fleet at Mers el-Kebir, defensive force used in between attacks and 
not against the specific source of the attacks as in the Caroline incident, or armed 
reprisals like those used by the United States against Libya. Yet criminal liability 
in any of these cases would seem absurd.189 A regime of personal criminal liability 
for leaders who authorized such conduct, as is now proposed, serves only to 
further advantage unlawful aggressors and disadvantage their victims, promoting 
greater injustice and further undermining deterrence of unlawful aggression. 
 
 In the past, states faced with the choice between protecting themselves 
from unlawful aggression or obeying flawed international law rules could simply 
ignore the flawed rules and cite the justice and necessity of their actions to avoid 
political or diplomatic criticism. Such normalization of law-breaking is 
detrimental to the law’s long-term moral credibility but at least it allows states to 
deal with the immediate threat of unlawful aggression. Under the Aggression 
Resolution, however, a state cannot defend itself against unlawful aggression 
without putting the leaders of the state in danger of individual criminal liability 
before the ICC. A leader who authorizes the use of necessary and proportionate 
defensive force could risk being branded a criminal and made subject to arrest, 
prosecution, and punishment. Worse still, when faced with the risk of individual 
criminal liability, some leaders may be tempted to put their personal interests 
ahead of the interests of their people and forgo the use of force needed for 
effective defense. 
 
 
 
                                                
189 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text; see supra 
note 56 and accompanying text; see supra Part II.B; see supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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A. How the Aggression Resolution Punishes Victims 
 
The problem arises because the Aggression Resolution, in its current form, 
incorporates the flawed UN Charter framework described above into the 
definition of the crime of aggression. The pertinent part of the Aggression 
Resolution reads: 
      
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” 
means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by 
a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or 
to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act 
of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” 
means the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations.190 
 
In plain terms, the Aggression Resolution criminalizes the use of armed force by 
one state against another state in “manifest violation” of the UN Charter. Thus, 
any use of defensive force not authorized by Article 51 of the UN Charter 
constitutes the “crime of aggression,” even if it is proportionate and necessary to 
prevent unlawful aggression. As we have seen, Article 51 has been interpreted to 
deny a right to use defensive force: against acts of unlawful aggression that do not 
rise to the level of an “armed attack”; by armed groups operating from the 
territory of another state; to prevent an imminent armed attack; to prevent a 
planned attack that is not yet imminent; to prevent a state from providing support 
or sanctuary to armed groups; in between armed attacks; against targets other 
than the direct source of an armed attack; and to deter future armed attacks.191 
Unless current law is changed to clearly reject these limitations on the use of force 
against unlawful aggression, the Aggression Resolution would impose personal 
criminal liability on leaders who authorize the use of defensive force in “manifest 
violation” of these illegitimate limitations.192  
                                                
190 Aggression Resolution, supra note 2, at 5, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1)-(2).   
191 See supra Parts II.A–C at 150–62; see also IV.A–B at 173–83.   
192 Significantly, commentary produced by the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
suggests that to satisfy the elements of the crime of aggression a defendant must be aware of “the 
existence or absence of a prior or imminent attack by another State.” See Non-paper by the 
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 The bleak scenario described above is not inevitable. As we have argued in 
Parts IV and VII, the text of the UN Charter can be fairly interpreted to avoid 
many (though not all) of the unjust limitations currently placed on defensive 
force.193 Should the ICC adopt the alternative interpretations of the UN Charter 
that we have proposed, it would thereby avoid most of the injustices of current 
international law. However, it is unlikely that the ICC will disregard the past 
decisions of the ICJ, no matter how flawed they now appear. Precedent in 
international law is so sparse that it would be surprising for the ICC to reject what 
little exists. Moreover, for years after the adoption of the Aggression Resolution, 
leaders of victim states will not know which uses of defensive force will result in their 
personal criminal liability. Leaders of victim states who order the use of defensive 
force will do so at their peril, not knowing which reading of Article 51 the ICC 
will adopt ex post facto. This inability to predict the legal consequences of national 
security decisions is almost as harmful to responsible decision-making as the 
knowledge that certain decisions will result in criminal liability.  
  
B. How the Aggression Resolution Fails to Deter Aggressors 
 
The previous section describes how the Aggression Resolution punishes 
victim states for using necessary and proportionate defensive force that 
nevertheless is not authorized under Article 51. Such undeserved punishment 
might be tolerable if the adoption of the Aggression Resolution would itself deter 
those acts of aggression against which Article 51 forbids victim states from using 
defensive force. If the ICC would effectively provide the centralized coercive 
enforcement that international law currently lacks, then there might be little need 
                                                                                                                                
Chairman on the Elements of Crimes, 28 May 2009, at 6,¶ 20, available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/Non-paper-Elements-of-the-CoA-28May2009-ENG.pdf.  
This is a welcome development, but we would urge that either the absence of an imminent attack 
be made an explicit element of the crime of aggression or the existence of an imminent attack be 
made an explicit element of an affirmative defense to the crime of aggression. Additionally, it could 
be argued that, under the Aggression Resolution, only a use of force that rises to the level of an 
armed attack under Article 51 possesses the “gravity and scale” necessary to constitute a “manifest 
violation” of the UN Charter. On such a reading, neither a limited act of aggression falling below 
the armed attack threshold nor a proportionate (and therefore equally limited) defensive response 
would constitute the crime of aggression. It follows that the Aggression Resolution would not 
unfairly punish victims but would instead confer impunity on aggressors. As we argue below, the 
correct position should be to condemn and punish deadly and destructive acts of aggression while 
empowering victims to use proportionate defensive force. 
193 The unjust limitations that seem unavoidable under any fair reading of the UN Charter are 
those regarding imminent and non-imminent attacks. See Part IV.A.3–4 supra at 176–82.   
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for states to use defensive force, and hence no problem if victim states are denied a 
right to effectively defend themselves. However, it seems clear that the ICC will 
not effectively deter unlawful aggression. State actors whose conduct satisfies the 
proposed elements of the crime of aggression may avoid prosecution by the ICC 
simply by not signing the Rome Statute, by signing the Rome Statute but 
declining to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression, or by currying favor 
with permanent members of the UN Security Council who can individually block 
referrals to the ICC or collectively suspend prosecutions indefinitely.194 
 
 Moreover, even if the ICC had the power to effectively deter unlawful 
aggression, the Aggression Resolution, in its current form, does not in fact 
criminalize many of the forms of unlawful aggression that we have discussed in the 
previous sections. First, the Aggression Resolution defines the crime of aggression 
to include only those uses of armed force whose “character, gravity and scale” 
constitute a “manifest violation” of the UN Charter.195 Thus, uses of armed force 
of limited gravity and scale are prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
but are not punishable under the Aggression Resolution. Second, consistent with 
current international law, the crime of aggression can only be committed by “a 
State,” not by an armed group acting on its own.196 Third, the Aggression 
Resolution includes within the crime of aggression only sending an armed group 
to complete specific operations or substantial involvement in specific uses of 
armed force.197 The Aggression Resolution does not criminalize providing 
financial, military, or logistical support for a group that is organizationally 
independent from the state, even though international law prohibits any 
“encouragement” of armed groups.198 Fourth, while the proposed definition seems 
to impose criminal liability for the “planning, preparation, initiation or execution . 
. . of an act of aggression,”199 the proposed elements of the crime of aggression 
require that “[t]he act of aggression . . . was committed.”200 In other words, the 
planning or preparation of an illegal use of armed force does not constitute an 
                                                
194 See Part V.A. supra at 183–84. 
195 See Aggression Resolution, supra note 2, at 5, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1).   
196 Id. Annex I, art. 8 bis (1) & (2).    
197 See Aggression Resolution, supra note 2, Annex I, art. 8 bis (2)(g). See also Nicaragua, supra note 16, 
at 346 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (stating that the General Assembly Resolution from which the 
wording of the Aggression Resolution to the Rome Statute is substantially derived classifies “as an 
act of aggression a State’s ‘substantial involvement’ in the sending of armed bands” into the 
territory of another state).   
198 See Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace, supra note 136, arts. 2(4), 2(5), & 2(6).   
199 Aggression Resolution, supra note 2, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1).   
200 Aggression Resolution, supra note 2, Annex II, art. 8 bis, Element 3.   
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international crime unless that use of armed force in fact occurs. Moreover, the 
Rome Statute does not contain an inchoate crime of conspiracy and therefore 
does not impose criminal liability until an aggressor moves beyond planning or 
preparing and actually commences the execution of an act of aggression. This is 
so despite the fact that conspiracy to commit aggression was a crime under the 
Nuremberg Charter201 and is itself a violation of international law.202   
 
 In all such cases, states that are victimized by aggression that the 
international system cannot or will not punish are forced to choose between doing 
nothing, leaving the attacks unpunished and their attackers undeterred from 
further attacks, or resorting to uses of force not authorized by international law. If 
they elect to respond with force, then they will be the ones branded as aggressors 
and their leaders may be held criminally liable, while the true aggressors can 
escape without punishment and without the stigma of criminality. 
 
C. Guidelines for Reform  
 
To avoid punishing victim states for legitimate uses of defensive force, we 
urge the Assembly of States Parties to revise the Aggression Resolution to 
explicitly adopt the reinterpretations of Article 51 proposed in this Article. The 
Aggression Resolution should not leave it up to the ICC to interpret Article 51 
during the course of future adjudication. As discussed above, ICC adjudication 
will likely reproduce the same unjust limitations on defensive force that currently 
exist. Moreover, states will not know what interpretation of Article 51 the ICC will 
adopt in future cases and this legal unpredictability is itself both unfair and 
unwise. 
 
 
                                                
201 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to London Agreement for the 
Establishment of an International Military Tribunal art. 6(a), 8 Aug., 1945, 59 Stat. 544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 (listing among Crimes Against Peace “participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of” a war of aggression). It is true that the Rome Statute imposes criminal 
liability on a person who “[a]ttempts to commit . . . a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step.” See Rome Statute, supra note 118, art. 25(3)(f). It follows 
that a state official may be held criminally liable for attempted aggression if the intended act of 
aggression is interrupted while still in its early stages.   
202 See Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace, supra note 136, art. 2(3) (prohibiting “[t]he 
preparation by the authorities of a State of the employment of armed force against another State 
for any purpose other than national or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or 
recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations”); see also id. art. 2(13)(i) (prohibiting 
“[c]onspiracy to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article”).   
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 Instead, the Aggression Resolution should explicitly permit states to use 
necessary and proportionate defensive force against deadly or destructive uses of 
armed force by states or non-state actors whether these are ongoing, imminent, or 
planned but not yet imminent. Defensive force should also be explicitly permitted 
against supporting states and targets other than the direct source of an attack. 
Finally, defensive force should be explicitly permitted in between attacks, 
including in the form of deterrent force, until the Security Council takes measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
 
 Importantly, we believe that the Aggression Resolution should place the 
burden on defendants to prove that their belief that defensive force was necessary 
to prevent an imminent or planned attack was not only sincere but also reasonable 
and based on clear and convincing evidence. This requirement will help ensure 
that states do not abuse the broader right of self-defense that we advocate. The 
best way to prevent states from masking aggression behind fraudulent claims of 
anticipatory self-defense is not to deny the right of anticipatory self-defense to all 
states, aggressors and victims alike, but rather to force leaders to produce the 
evidence on the basis of which they concluded that defensive force was necessary 
and to subject that evidence to public scrutiny.   
 
 Finally, the Aggression Resolution should be revised to better utilize what 
little deterrent capacity the ICC possesses. First, the offense definition of 
aggression should criminalize all uses of armed force that may result in the loss of 
territory or human life, thereby deterring uses of armed force that are limited in 
their “gravity and scale.” Second, the offense definition should criminalize the use 
of armed force by armed groups, thereby deterring both the armed groups 
themselves as well as state leaders who aid or abet those armed groups and who 
may therefore be held criminally liable as accomplices.203 Third, conspiracy to 
commit aggression should be included as an inchoate offense, in keeping with the 
Nuremberg precedent,204 which may be used to punish leaders who plan or 
prepare acts of aggression that do not occur, including acts of aggression 
prevented by the anticipatory defensive force of victim states. 
 
                                                
203 See Rome Statute, supra note 118, art. 25(3)(c) (“In accordance with this Statute, a person shall 
be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
if that person: . . . [f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or 
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for 
its commission.”).  
204 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.   
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IX.  Conclusion 
 
As the previous parts have shown, the improper limitations that 
international law currently imposes on responses to unlawful aggression have the 
overall effect of advantaging aggressors and disadvantaging victims, an effect that 
can only hurt the cause of justice and stability. While it seems unrealistic to think 
that Article 51, or any other aspect of the UN Charter, will soon be amended, we 
urge the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court to revise 
its Aggression Resolution before its members can vote to formally amend the Rome 
Statute beginning in 2017.205 
 
 To be clear about our proposals: Nothing requires a victim state to do 
anything in response to unlawful aggression. States may rightfully worry that a 
response will yield more risk than reward. But international law ought to at least 
allow victim states to determine for themselves whether responding to unlawful 
aggression with force is in their long-term self-interest. Current international law, 
and especially the proposed definition of the crime of aggression, seriously limits a 
victim state’s options. 
 
 In a larger perspective, the advantaging of unlawful aggressors hurts all 
states as it undermines international stability. It is not hard to imagine that the 
current limitations on responses to unlawful aggression have contributed to the 
unfortunate frequency of aggression in today’s world. If current international law 
did not impose such costs—of having to break the law to defend against unlawful 
aggression—one can imagine instances where some past aggressors might have 
hesitated and some past victims might have responded, helping to avoid future 
aggression.206 
 
 More than anything, international law’s unjust limitations on the use of 
defensive force miss an opportunity to make international law a more effective 
force for justice and peace. Every time international law condemns a leader for 
                                                
205 Such reforms would particularly benefit states that accept the legitimacy of international law 
despite its flaws. Currently, aggressors are able to use the unjust limitations of international law to 
their strategic advantage, using unlawful armed force in ways that do not trigger the right of self-
defense under Article 51. Meanwhile, victim states that accept the legitimacy of international law 
will either obey international law to their own detriment or be compelled to violate international 
law and suffer that additional moral and reputational cost to themselves. By contrast, states that 
reject the legitimacy of international law, and that would not hesitate to violate international law to 
protect themselves, currently present more dangerous targets for an aggressor. 
206 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the 1973 Arab-Israeli War).   
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ordering the use of necessary defensive force—U.S. President Barack Obama, for 
instance, for authorizing missile strikes on Al Qaeda camps in Pakistan—it 
reduces its ability to effectively condemn leaders who violate both international 
law and principles of justice—Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, for instance, 
for crimes against humanity against the people of Darfur. 
 
 If this were a different world—one with an effective centralized law 
enforcement authority, something akin to modern domestic criminal law—one 
might be able to support some (though not all) of the law’s limitations on 
responses to aggression, specifically, those limitations discussed in Part VI. But 
that is not the world in which we live, nor the world that we are likely to see in our 
lifetimes, the noble efforts of the International Criminal Court notwithstanding. 
As discussed previously, the Court cannot effectively enforce international law.207 
Moreover, if the Aggression Resolution is any indication of its future direction, the 
Court will not only lack coercive power, but over time will squander its 
opportunity to build a reputation for doing justice and thereby lose its opportunity 
to gain normative influence. 
 
 We share with others both the desire for peace and the abhorrence of war, 
sentiments that may have originally motivated many of the unjust limitations we 
have examined. People of good conscience may believe that it is better for victim 
states to suffer injustice than to forcibly resist aggression and thereby risk a 
broader and more deadly conflict. However, as we have argued, rules that are 
perceived as seriously unjust to victims will not encourage compliance with the 
rules but rather legitimize their violation, resistance, and subversion. Moreover, 
prohibiting necessary and proportionate defensive force removes deterrents to 
aggression, advantages unlawful aggressors, and disadvantages their victims. The 
effect of such a legal regime is to reduce, not increase, the chances of peace, 
stability, and justice in the world. Those who seek peace at the expense of justice 
may end up with neither. 
                                                
207 See Part V.A supra. 
